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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BATSON PARADOX
"'[E]very right ... must have a remedy ...."" Although this idea runs
deep through our jurisprudence, it is not strictly true. The challenge is to
determine which rights are so important as to require a remedy. Sometimes this
is easy, as in the case of Batson v. Kentuck,,2 which established that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges
to strike prospective jurors on account of their race.' Under Batson, a
prosecutor is free to exercise peremptory challenges until the defendant objects
on the ground that the prosecutor has engaged in intentional discrimination on
the basis of race.4 If the court finds that the defendant has made a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to
present a race-neutral explanation for the strikei If the court discredits that
explanation, or if the defendant can show the race-neutral explanation to be
pretextual, then a Batson violation has occurred.6
t Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law A.B. Brosn Unicrsity. J D. Yale
University.
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I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAmt BLACKSTO.sE.
COMMENTARIES * 109).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. An earlier case, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). had established the same general principle
but insisted on a pattern of discrimination in case after case as proof of an equal protection %tolation Id
at 224. Batson overruled this aspect of Swain, allowing proof of a prima facie case of impermissible
discrimination from the facts of jury selection at a single trial Batson. 476 U S at 93-96
4. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
5. See id. at 97-98.
6. See id.; Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259. 261 (8th Cir 1996) lallossing defendant to show that
prosecutor's race-neutral reason is pretextual); cf Purkett %. Elem. 115 S Ct 1769 (1995) (per cunam)
(holding that race-neutral explanation need not be persuasis e. or es en plausible. to ads ancc Baron analysis
to ultimate question of purposeful discrimination).
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Batson's timing alone suggests that it announced an important principle.
The case was decided in 1986-a time when the Court was not particularly
friendly to the claims of criminal defendants. It overruled Swain v. Alabama,
7
a case decided in 1965, when the Court's concerns for protecting criminal
defendants' rights, and for combatting racial discrimination, were at their apex.
Even more remarkably, in the years since Batson-years in which the Court
has grown no friendlier to defendants' claims-the Court has clung
tenaciously to the Batson norm, continually expanding its scope.9 Obviously,
the Court believes that it is on to something important in Batson and its
progeny.
If every important right has a remedy, then surely there ought to be a
remedy for a Batson violation. t Undoubtedly there is-at least at the trial
level. Upon finding a violation of Batson, the trial court may order that the
improperly challenged jurors remain seated, or it may dismiss the jurors
7. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
8. The Rehnquist Court has revealed its lack of enthusiasm for the claims of criminal defendants most
clearly in its dramatic narrowing of the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993) (rejecting claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence as ground for federal
habeas relief); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (raising standard habeas petitioner must meet
to obtain federal court review of claim procedurally defaulted in state court); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467 (1991) (raising standard habeas petitioner must meet to obtain federal court review of claim raised in
second or successive federal habeas petition); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (forbidding
development of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure in federal habeas cases). For an excellent
description of the recent revolution in habeas corpus law, see Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331 (1993).
The Rehnquist Court's antipathy to the claims of criminal defendants has surfaced outside the habeas
context as well. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (holding federal prosecutor has
no duty to disclose exculpatory information in his possession to grand juries considering criminal charges);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (finding automatic imposition of mandatory sentence of life
in prison without possibility of parole for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment within meaning of Eighth Amendment); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991) (allowing capital sentencing juries to consider victim impact statements); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989) (allowing death penalty for murderer who was 16 years old when crime was committed);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (finding execution of mentally retarded people convicted of capital
offenses does not violate Eighth Amendment), But cf. Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the
Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273, 275 (1987) (noting that review of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinions "suggests that the future of criminal procedure, even in a Court in which the
views of Justice Rehnquist held greater sway than they do now, would not differ as radically from current
law as his critics suggest"). See generally Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797,
821 (1992) ("[I]t is evident that this Court has a great hostility to the rights of criminal defendants.").
9. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (extending Batson to gender-based
peremptory challenges); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to peremptory
challenges by defense counsel in criminal cases); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(extending Batson to peremptory challenges by private litigants in civil cases); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991) (extending Batson to objection by white defendant to exclusion of black jurors).
10. In this Article, I frequently refer to a "Batson violation" or a "Batson error" in a generic sense.
I do not mean a scenario identical to the one in the Batson case itself (a prosecutor's discriminatory strike
of a minority juror of the same race as the defendant), but any of the scenarios to which the Court has
extended the Batson norm-situations where the juror and defendant are not of the same race, situations
where the party engaging in discrimination is the defendant, and situations where an attorney strikes jurors
on account of gender rather than race.
Solving the Batson Paradox
already seated and begin the process of jury selection anew." But what if the
trial court errs, finding no Batson violation where there actually was one?' 2
What is the appropriate remedy on direct appeal? 1
In keeping with its view that Batson error is serious business, the Supreme
Court has assumed, but never formally ruled, that the appropriate appellate
remedy is automatic reversal of the conviction. That is, the Court has never
suggested that a conviction tainted by Batson error might nonetheless be
affirmed if, for example, the evidence against the defendant were
overwhelming; it has instead simply reversed convictions outright without
performing harmless error analysis. 4
Because the Court has never directly addressed the question of remedy, its
reasons for choosing automatic reversal over harmless error analysis are not
clear. Perhaps the Court agrees with Susan Herman's instinct that "harmless
error analysis would seem irrelevant"' 5 on Batson appeals. The Batson "right"
is actually a package of equal protection rights: rights of the defendant to a fair
trial free of the stigma of racial prejudice, and rights of prospective jurors both
to be free of that stigma and to participate fully in the criminal justice system.
Especially where the injury is to the jurors' rights, the Court may think that it
would be beside the point to examine the impact of that injury on the verdict.
Where it is the defendant who is injured by the discrimination, the Court may
believe that the effects of the injury are so diffuse as to make harmless error
analysis impossible.
The Court may even be right: Batson error may indeed be ill-suited to
appellate review for impact on the verdict. But this does not necessarily mean,
1I. As the Court noted in Batson:
[W]e express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of
discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new
jury from a panel not previously associated with the case. or to disallow the discriminatory
challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the vcnire
Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 n.24 (citation omitted). Some courts have determined that reinstating the wrongly
challenged jurors is an appropriate remedy. See. e.g., State ex rel. Curry v. Bowman. 885 S W 2d 421.
424-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (approving practice of retaining improperly challenged jurors)
Other courts have deemed dismissing the entire panel to be the "'better practice " See. e g. State v
McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159 (N.C. 1993).
Charles Ogletree has argued that the alternative of dismissing the entire array and starting jury
selection anew is insufficiently punitive. See Charles J. Ogletree. Just Sa. No' A Proposal to Eliminate
Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges. 31 A., CRist L RE%, 1099. 1116 t 1994) On
the other hand, Albert Alschuler has argued that neither of the Batson Court's tso alternatives as
satisfactory. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court arid the Jury. %foir Dire. Peremptory Challenges.
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 177-79 (1989).
12. The inverse question-"what if the trial court errs. finding a Batson %iolation w-here there actually
was not one?"-is a distinct issue that is outside the scope of this Article. For an explanation of why this
issue is distinct from the one I address in this Article. see infra note 294.
13. In this Article, I address only the question of the appropriate remedy for Batson error on direct
appeal. I do not consider the question of whether or when a remedy should be available on collateral
review.
14. See infra note 148.
15. Susan N. Herman. Why the Court Loves Batson Representation.Reinfortrement Colorblindness,
and the Jury, 67 TtJL. L. REV. 1807, 1831 n.98 (1993).
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as the Court seems to assume, that the appropriate remedy for a Batson
violation is a rule of automatic reversal. For as the Supreme Court (albeit a
very different majority from the one that produced Batson) has made clear in
recent years, the remedy of appellate reversal exists for one purpose only-to
protect the reliability of the jury's "factual finding" on the question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence.' 6 If Batson error does not undermine the
reliability of verdicts, then appellate courts should affirm, not reverse,
convictions.
Herein lies part of the paradox of Batson. For all of the Court's heated
rhetoric about the evils of discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges, the Court has firmly rejected the idea that a juror's race or gender
has any bearing on how that juror will view the evidence in a case or vote on
the question of guilt or innocence. By taking this position, the Court has
defined Batson violations in a way that absolutely forecloses any possibility
that such violations affect the reliability of the verdict. Batson violations do
other bad things, of course: they stigmatize litigants and jurors, and wrongly
prevent jurors from participating in the justice system. These are serious equal
protection harms, but they have nothing to do with the reliability of verdicts.
Thus the Court has articulated a package of rights which, in logic, require no
appellate remedy.
That, however, is not the whole paradox. For there are indeed Justices on
the Court who should see harm in a Batson scenario-not just any kind of
harm, but the kind that makes verdicts unreliable and warrants reversal on
appeal. These are Justices who embrace the idea that a juror's race or gender
is at least a minimally rational predictor of that juror's likely perspective on
certain issues in a criminal trial. But these are also the Justices who have
opposed and criticized the entire Batson enterprise and who see no error of any
kind in a Batson situation. This, then, is the full paradox of Batson: the
Justices who would find harm in a Batson violation cannot; the Justices who
can find harm in a Batson violation will not.
In this Article, I will explain and resolve this paradox about the true nature
of the harm that Batson error causes to criminal verdicts. To do so, I will first
show how the paradox arises-how it is that the Court's proponents of the
Batson norm have managed the incoherent task of creating a type of error that
is, by definition, harmless in every case. I do this in Parts II through IV. In the
balance of the Article, I show that the resolution of the paradox emerges not
from curing the incoherence in the views of Batson's proponents, but from
resolving the far deeper incoherence in the views of the Justices who have
opposed and criticized the Batson norm. I argue that the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges does indeed undermine the reliability of criminal
verdicts and should trigger a rule of automatic reversal on appeal, but not
16. See infra Part III.
[Vol. 106: 93
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because it violates any value in the Equal Protection Clause. 7 Rather, this
sort of discrimination violates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury that
represents the community.'8 I conclude that the Court must deploy the Batson
rule to protect the Sixth Amendment value of community representation on the
jury, and that the Court should therefore overrule its holding to the contrary
in Holland v. Illinois.19
II. Do RACE AND GENDER SUGGEST VIEWPOINT'?
THE LIFE, DEATH, AND LIFE OF THE "THEORY OF DIFFERENCE" IN THE
SUPREME COURT
In the prosecutor's office where I once worked, a supervisor always
counseled new attorneys litigating drug cases to use a peremptory challenge to
remove any prospective juror who came to court with a coffee mug or shoulder
bag bearing the emblem of the local public broadcasting station. He reasoned
that people get such merchandise in only one way-by donating money to
public broadcasting. Anyone who would give money to public broadcasting,
he argued, was too much of a mushy-headed liberal to give the government's
case a favorable hearing.
Such rough inferences drive our system of peremptory challenges. The
supervisor knew that the inference was ridiculously overbroad, but his
experience told him that it was not flatly irrational. He saw enough of a
correlation between a juror's television and radio preferences and her likely
viewpoint on drug enforcement to make the peremptory strike worthwhile.
For many years, the Supreme Court has struggled with the similar question
of whether it is rational for an attorney to draw inferences about viewpoint
from a prospective juror's race or gender. This inquiry has been just one piece
of a larger problem that has plagued the Court: Is it ever rational, in any
context, to attribute distinctive views or beliefs to a segment of the community
defined by an immutable characteristic like race or gender? At times the Court
seems to have thought so. For example, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,20 the Court approved a system of preferential licensing for minority-
owned broadcasting companies on the theory that such a system would
enhance broadcast diversity. The Court deemed it "a legitimate inference...
to draw that as more minorities gain ownership and policymaking roles in the
17. See infra text accompanying note 178.
18. I do not address the question of whether jury dscrimination in ci" it case.s iolatc, the jur trial
guarantee in the Seventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST amend VII
19. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
20. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constrs. Inc % Pena. 115 S Ct 2097 4 1995) The
Adarand opinion overruled Metro Broadcasting on the level of judicial scrutin) applicable to federal
affirmative action plans; Adarand did not explicitly call into question Metro Broideastmgn's broadcast
diversity theory.
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media, varying perspectives will be more fairly represented on the
airwaves. 2 ' The Metro Broadcasting Court found it rational for Congress to
attribute certain broad views and preferences, even if not a "cohesive,
collective viewpoint, '21 to minority groups.
On the other hand, the Court has often scolded parties for drawing
precisely this inference. In Miller v. Johnson,23 the Court held that when a
state draws voting district lines for the predominant purpose of turning racial
minorities into district majorities, that plan violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of the district's geographical
shape.24 According to the Court, mapping districts in this way is inevitably
infected with the "offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."'2 5 The very notion
of using race to predict viewpoint was, for the Miller Court, irrational
26stereotyping.
In one area, however, the Court has historically been unequivocal in
embracing what might be called the "theory of difference" 27-that is, the
21. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 582. Justice Powell made a similar argument on the benefits of
racial and other sorts of diversity on university and medical school campuses in Regents of Univ. of
California v. Bakke:
The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment, and creation"-so essential to the quality of higher
education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.
... An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background-whether it be
ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school
of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and
better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
22. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 582.
23. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
24. See id. at 2494.
25. Id. at 2486 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993)).
26. The Court took this view even while engaging in some of that "irrational" stereotyping itself. The
plaintiffs in Miller were white voters from the district that had been drawn to create a black majority. See
id. at 2485. To establish their standing to challenge the districting plan, the plaintiffs had to show that they
had suffered injury. See id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(summarizing standards for constitutional requirement of "injury in fact"). As Justice Stevens pointed out
in his Miller dissent, the only harm that these plaintiffs suffered was the "representational harm" identified
in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827; namely, the harm that arises in a racially gerrymandered district when the
elected officials come to believe that their duty is to represent only the members of the dominant group,
rather than their entire constituency. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Ironically, this
theory of standing depends on precisely the same inference about the viewpoint-predictive value of race
that the Miller Court condemns. That is, it depends on the simple idea--openly scorned in Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court-"that individuals of the same race share a single political interest." Id.
at 2487. Thus, in the very same case, the Court both implicitly endorsed and explicitly condemned the idea
that race predicts perspective.
27. This theory has gained currency in recent scholarship, particularly that of some critical race and
feminist theorists. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,
1066, 1084 (1991) (arguing that "race may have an influence on how members of society understand their
worlds and each other," and that "the views of subordinated groups on the extent and nature of
subordination are likely to differ from those of majority groups"); Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in
Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV. 107, 149-50 (1994) (summarizing "difference"
scholarship and arguing that "[r]ace is a determinative prism through which people interpret social events
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theory that jurors' race and gender are at least minimally rational predictors '
of their perspective. 29 This area is the law of grand and petit jury
composition. Prior to Batson, the theory of difference was an important
premise of the Court's work in making sure that grand and petit juries are truly
representative of discrete segments of the community.
The Court first expressed this premise openly in Ballard i. United
States,3" where it exercised its supervisory power over the administration of
justice in the federal courts3 to require the inclusion of women in the venires
from which grand and petit juries were selected. While rejecting the simplistic
notion that men and women act predictably as rigid classes, '2 the Court
readily embraced the subtler idea that "the two sexes are not fungible; a
community made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both. '33 "[A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost," the Court
insisted, "if either sex is excluded" from juries.
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to this theory of difference in Taylor
v. Louisiana,35  when it expanded Ballard from a supervisory to a
constitutional rule. Taylor asked whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
and understand both human behavior and the law and through w hich they apply the latter to the former").
Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equalit .; Sex Differences. and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE LJ 913. 965 (1983)
(arguing "that women have distinctive perspectives that must play an important role in social
transformation"); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparatons. 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 323-35, 360 (1987) (urging reform of Critical Legal Studies movement to
adopt more unambiguously distinctive perspective, or "normatve intuitionsl.] of those on the bottom-)
28. By using the word "predictor." I do not mean to suggest that race or gender "'predicts" a juror's
perspective in the same way that, say. a drop in barometric pressure "predicts" a nasty turn in the seathcr
I am referring instead to something more vague and less confident, a suspicion or hunch that an attorney
thinks is more likely true than not and one that the attorney therefore comfortably relies upon shen
exercising peremptory challenges.
29. When I speak of a juror's "perspective" or "vess point" tn this Article. I mean a diffuse
experiential filter through which a juror perceives the evidence and the events at trial See Marlk Cammack.
In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L. 405. 416 (1995) ("All experience is mediated by
preexisting knowledge structures, constellations of assumptions, tnterests. and purposes that filter and
organize perception as it occurs."). I do not mean a conscious. hard-and-fast commitment to specitfic
outcome-determinative beliefs. This sort of commitment is the stuff of true "bias." making a juror properly
challengeable for cause.
30. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
3 1. See generally McNabb v. United States. 318 U S 332. 340--41 1943) (describing Supreme Court',
supervisory power).
32. See Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 194. Earlier in that same Term, the Court had flirted u th the more radical idea that "'sage
earners," as a group, can rationally be presumed to share a distinctine %sewpoint In Tiel t Southern Par
Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), the Court exercised its supervisory power to condemn the practice of excluding
all laborers paid a daily wage from jury service. See id at 225 The district court had rested its decision
squarely on the idea that wage earners, as a group, shared a common perspecti'.e See id at 220 The
Supreme Court, however, did not analyze the problem in quite this %%ay Instead, it condemned the
exclusion of wage earners as inconsistent with "the proper rules and principles of jury selection "I/d at 221
While suggesting that the exclusion of wage earners would do "violence to the democratic nature of the
jury system" and "breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the jut) as the instrument of the
economically and socially privileged." id. at 223-24. the Court now,,here suggested that the exclusion w.ould
strip the jury of a discrete and identifiable perspective.
35. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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an impartial jury prohibited a system in which women could not be called for
jury service unless they first filed a written declaration that they wished to
serve.36 Holding that "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross
section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial, 37 the Court struck down Louisiana's "opt-in" system for
women. 38 The Court endorsed Ballard's rejection of the "view that an all-
male panel drawn from various groups in the community would be as truly
representative as if women were included. 39 Quoting Ballard for the
proposition that "'a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded, ' ' 40 the
Court held that the core function of the jury is eviscerated "if the jury pool is
made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive
groups are excluded from the pool.
41
The Court has also embraced the theory of difference in the context of
racial exclusion. In Peters v. Kiff,42 the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus
to a defendant who had been indicted for, and convicted of, burglary by grand
and petit juries from which blacks had been systematically excluded. The
novelty in Peters was that the defendant was white. Seizing on this, the State
argued that he had suffered no harm by the exclusion of blacks from his grand
and petit juries. The Court rejected this argument.4 3 Writing for himself and
two other Justices, Justice Marshall concluded that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment" forbade a state from submitting a defendant of
any race to a trial by a jury from which blacks had been systematically
excluded. To the State's argument that the white defendant had not been
harmed by this exclusion, Justice Marshall responded that "the exclusion from
jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of citizens has a potential
impact that is too subtle and too pervasive to admit of confinement to
36. See id. at 523.
37. Id. at 528.
38. See id. at 533.
39. Id. at 531.
40. Id. at 532 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946)).
41. Id. at 530.
42. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
43. The Peters case produced three groups of three Justices. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall
voted to grant the writ on a due process theory. See id. at 501-05. Justices Brennan, White, and Powell
concurred in the judgment, preferring to grant the writ on the theory that the racial exclusion violated policy
embodied in a federal statute. See id. at 505-07. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist
dissented. See id. at 507-13. While the case produced no majority or plurality opinion, only three of the
Justices explicitly disagreed with Justice Marshall's comments about the nature of the harm caused by the
exclusion of black jurors. See id. at 510-I I.
For a thorough analysis of the various opinions in Peters v. Kiff-from a person who was involved
in the formulation of Justice Marshall's opinion-see Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination
in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyvay?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 739-42 (1992).
44. The "impartial jury" requirement of the Sixth Amendment was not available as a basis for decision
because the trial in Peters had preceded Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying Sixth
Amendment right to petit jury to states through Fourteenth Amendment), and Duncan did not apply
retroactively, see DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). See Peters, 407 U.S. at 496, Justice Marshall
relied instead on the due process notion that a tribunal must be impartial. See id. at 501-02.
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particular issues or particular cases."" More fundamentally, Justice Marshall
refused to assume that the exclusion of black jurors has an impact only on
cases touching explicitly on race:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as
a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case that may be presented. "6
Thus, while race may not offer hard and fast predictions on precise voting
patterns in specific cases, it does produce "a perspective on human events" that
cannot be excluded without subverting the representativeness of the jury.
The Court's pre-Batson cases on grand and petit jury discrimination
reflected a commitment to the view that one might rationally glean some hint
of a person's perspective from his or her race or gender. Yet in 1986, when
the Court began to grapple with the discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge, it had a change of heart. 7 Race and gender became not just
impermissible but flatly irrational predictors of juror perspective.
The Court was initially somewhat tentative on the subject. In Batson,4
the first of the Court's cases limiting the use of the peremptory challenge in
individual trials,49 the Court announced the rule that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to strike
prospective jurors solely on account of their race." The Court seemed to
exclude the possibility that a prosecutor might have even the most minimally
rational reason for wanting to excuse a juror from serving in any case because
of his race: "A person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.'"...
The Court did not say exactly what it meant by "unrelated"; it might have
meant that race was unrelated to a juror's performance as a matter of law, or
it might have meant that race was unrelated to a juror's performance as a
matter of fact. The Court's proposition about "unrelatedness" was, however,
45. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503.
46. Id. at 503-04. In support of this proposition. Justice Marhall cited Justice Douglas's s.ords about
the effect of gender exclusion from Ballard. See id. at 504 n. 12 (quoting Ballard % United States. 329 U S
187, 193-94 (1946)).
47. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Ser'ice as Politcal Partcipation Akin to 1btng. 80 CORNELL L
REv. 203, 210 (1995) (noting "great deal of tension" between Court's older and most recent cases on issue
of whether group affiliation predicts juror perspective).
48. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49. See supra note 3.
50. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
51. Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.. 328 U.S. 217. 227 (1946) (Frankfurter. J.
dissenting)).
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a quote from Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co.52 In that opinion, Frankfurter argued quite plainly that the
exclusion of the group of "daily wage earners" from federal juries in California
could have no impact on those juries' deliberations, since wage earners, as a
matter of fact, do not have "a different social outlook .... a different sense of
justice .... [or] a different conception of a juror's responsibility than their
fellow workers paid by the week."53 Thus, while the Batson Court did not
directly address the predictive value of race on juror performance, it indirectly
suggested that there was none.54
Just a few years later, however, the Court stated this point more clearly.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,55 the Court explained that an attorney
exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of race might have two
conceivable reasons for doing so: either "open hostility" or "some hidden and
unarticulated fear. '56 Both, the Court stated, are irrational: the only "rational
way" for the attorney to proceed would be "without the use of classifications
based on ancestry or skin color., 57 In Edmonson, the Court said more clearly
what it had hinted at in Batson: Classifications based on race are not just
impermissible as a matter of law but are also irrational as a matter of fact.
58
By the time the Court decided J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,59 it was not
merely announcing that race and gender do not rationally predict juror
perspective, but preaching that view with a vengeance. J.E.B. was an action
initiated by the State of Alabama for paternity and child support. At trial, the
State and the defendant played the common game of dueling peremptories:
60
the State used nine of its ten challenges to remove men from the jury; the
defendant used all but one of his to remove women.6' When the State
52. 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 230 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The exclusion of
the daily wage earners does not remove a group who would, in the language of Mr. Justice Holmes, 'act
otherwise than those who are drawn would act."') (quoting Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906)).
54. In the Court's next case addressing Batson, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court said
nothing more about the issue. It merely cited Batson for the proposition that juror race "simply 'is
unrelated"' to juror fitness. Id. at 410 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87).
55. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
56. Id. at 631.
57. Id.
58. I am not suggesting that the Court's rejection of the theory of difference was its only, or even its
primary, reason for holding race-based peremptory challenges to be impermissible. The Court has stated
a number of reasons why such challenges violate the law: they deny the equal protection rights of the
challenged jurors, harm the community, and compromise the integrity of the justice system. See infra Part
IV. Under prevailing law, however, see infra Parts IllI-IV, these reasons have little to do with the question
at the heart of this Article: What harm does Batson error pose to the reliability of verdicts?
59. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
60. Cf. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 642-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In a civil trial, the attorneys for
each side ... use their peremptory strikes in direct opposition to one another, and for precisely contrary
ends."); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 679 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Since defendants
presumably use their peremptory challenges in the opposite fashion, the State's action simply does not
result in juries 'deliberately tipped toward' conviction." (citation omitted)).
61. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
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defended its gender-based use of peremptories on the theory that men and
women might rationally be presumed to have different views on issues relating
to paternity and child support, the Court responded with thinly veiled contempt
and hostility. The Court belittled the State's "quasi-empirical claim," noting
that "[t]he majority of studies suggest that gender plays no identifiable role in
jurors' attitudes."6 The Court criticized the State for "'offer[ing] virtually no
support for the conclusion that gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror's
[sic] attitudes,"63 but suggested that such a stereotype would be far too gross
even if the State could have "conjured up" some statistical support for it.'4
The State's argument about gender-based differences in perspective contained,
at very most, only a "shred" of truth 65 that did not support the exercise of a
peremptory challenge. Thus, in cases forbidding discriminatory peremptory
strikes, the Court has, with increasing firmness and stridency, rejected the very
theory of difference that it had embraced for many years in its earlier jury
discrimination cases.
This is not to say, however, that the theory of difference is dead. In fact,
quite the opposite is true: The theory of difference lives on in the opinions of
the Justices who have opposed the Batson rule and its extension. In Batson
itself, Chief Justice Burger warmly embraced the theory in his dissenting
opinion. He quoted Professor Barbara Babcock for the proposition that
"'[c]ommon human experience, common sense, psychosociological studies, and
public opinion polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people
statistically have predispositions that would make them inappropriate jurors for
particular kinds of cases."'6 Peremptory challenges exercised on account of
race were admirable for "'allow[ing] the covert expression of what we dare not
say but know is true more often than not.' 67 Justice Rehnquist said much the
same thing in his Batson dissent.
6
62. Id. at 1426 n.9.
63. Id. at 1427. This was an ironic cnticism for the Court to make The best support aailable for the
State's claim was the Court's own words in Ballard v. United States. 329 U S 187 (1946). see supra text
accompanying notes 30-34, which the J.E.B. Court itself quoted extensively and appro ingl) See J E B.
114 S. Ct. at 1424. The J.E.B. majority's vacillation on the validity of the Court's earlier insight in Ballard
seems to confirm Justice Scalia's assertion that the Court's J.E.B opinion is "in opposition to its earlier
Sixth Amendment 'fair-cross-section' cases." Id. at 1436 (Scalia. J . dissenting)
64. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 n.ll.
65. Id.
66. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79. 121 (1986) (Burger. C.J . dissenting) (quoting Barbara Babcock.
Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power". 27 STAN. L. REv. 545. 553-54 (1975)) The Chief Justice
makes a similar point when he suggests that "'each race may have its own special concerns. or e en may
tend to favor its own . I...' Id. at 123 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting United States % Leslie. 783 F2d
541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
67. Id. at 121 (Burger, C.., dissenting) (quoting Babcock. supra note 66. at 554)
68. Justice Rehnquist explained:
The use of group affiliations, such as age. race. or occupation. as a "prox)" for potential juror
partiality, based on the assumption or belief that members of one group are more likely to favor
defendants who belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the
State's exercise of peremptory challenges .... Indeed.. the use of such "promies" by both
the State and the defendant may be extremely useful in eliminating from the jury persons ssho
1996]
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Over time, just as Batson's proponents grew blunter in asserting that group
affiliation predicts nothing about juror perspective, Batson's opponents grew
more committed to the opposite assertion. For example, in his dissenting
opinion in Powers v. Ohio,69 Justice Scalia described the notion that "all
groups tend to have particular sympathies and hostilities" as an "undeniable
reality."7 Justices O'Connor and Thomas stated similar views in their
opinions in Georgia v. McColum. 7' By the time of J.E.B., the dissenters were
openly and stridently endorsing the theory of difference. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated categorically that "[t]he two sexes differ, both biologically
and, to a diminishing extent, in experience." 72  "It is not merely
'stereotyping,"' he continued, "to say that these differences may produce a
difference in outlook which is brought to the jury room., 73 Justice Scalia,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, mocked Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion for its "fervent defense of the proposition il ny a pas de
diffirence entre les hommes et les femmes."74 Justice O'Connor said it most
simply of all: "We know that like race, gender matters. 75
Batson and its progeny have thus divided the Justices into two distinct
camps on the question of whether group affiliation is a rational proxy for
perspective. 71 On the one hand, Batson's champions doggedly deny that an
might be biased in one way or another.
Id. at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
69. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
70. Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now clear that conscious and
unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants .... ); see id. at 60
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with Justice O'Connor); see also Brown v. North Carolina,
479 U.S. 940, 941 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("We ought not delude ourselves
that the deep faith that race should never be relevant has completely triumphed over the painful social
reality that, sometimes, it may be.").
72. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1435 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The French expression means "there is no difference between
men and women."
75. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor is perhaps not a true dissenter from the
Batson line of cases; for example, she concurred in the Court's opinion in Batson itself, and concurred in
J.E.B. because she felt that the nation's commitment to nondiscrimination in jury selection outweighed the
litigants' desires to remove certain classes of jurors who might rationally be presumed to harbor defined
views. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Still, of all of the Justices who have endorsed Batson and its
extension to at least some new contexts, Justice O'Connor has been the most vocal in expressing
reservations about the rule of Batson and its impact on the institution of the peremptory challenge. See id.
at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because I believe the peremptory remains an important litigator's tool
and a fundamental part of the process of selecting impartial juries, our increasing limitation of it gives me
pause."); Brown, 479 U.S. at 941-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (emphasizing that
Batson limitation on unfettered exercise of peremptories ought to be limited to race-based peremptories).
76. As some have suggested, it seems odd to ask whether group affiliation is a rational proxy for
perspective for the purposes of the equal protection analysis in Batson. Equal protection law demands more
than a rational basis of a state actor who would intentionally disadvantage a person on account of race or
gender. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995) (requiring State to present "compelling"
interest to defend racial classification successfully); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring
State to present "important" interest to defend gender classification successfully). Thus the normative
philosophy of the Equal Protection Clause may be at war with even a minimally rational race- or gender-
based peremptory challenge. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123-25 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
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attorney may rationally infer anything about a juror's viewpoint from his or her
race or gender. On the other hand, Batson's critics openly embrace the
idea-grounded in decades of precedent in jury discrimination cases'-that
attorneys may rationally infer that members of discrete groups bring unique
perspectives to the jury.
As Chief Justice Burger suggested in his Batson dissent," the verdict of
social science appears to favor the critics. In a thorough study of the social
science data on the impact of race on jury verdicts, Nancy King recently
demonstrated that juror race "can and does affect jury decisions."79 While far
from unequivocal, the studies catalogued in King's article suggest differences
in the ways that black and white jurors assess guilt when the defendant or
victim is black, ° in the ways that black and white jurors assess the credibility
of police testimony,s in the ways that black and white jurors react to black
defense counsel, 2 and in the ways that black and white jurors determine
sentences (in jurisdictions where they are permitted to do so)."3 The social
science data also suggest at least some differences in the ways in which male
and female jurors are likely to vote in certain kinds of cases.'
dissenting); Alschuler, supra note II. at 201-03.
This criticism, however, might focus on the wrong issue. The relevant question might not be ,hether
rationally exercised peremptory challenges are compelling or important state interests, but whether such
challenges serve compelling or important state interests. See J.E.B.. 114 S. Ct at 1438 (Scalia. J
dissenting); Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In any event, this Article is not concerned
with the question of whether Batson itself represents a sound application of equal protection analysis. it
is concerned with the separate question of whether Batson presents a sound account of the fair tinal harm
caused by the discriminatory peremptory challenge. See infra note 325.
The Court's newest member, Justice Breyer. has had no real opportunity to make his c'.ws known
on the question of whether group affiliation is a rational predictor of juror perspectie
77. See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
78. See 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger. C.J., dissenting) (quoting Babcock. supra note 66. at 553-54).
79. Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination. Measuring the Effects of Juror Race
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63, 99 (1993); see also Cammack. supra note 29. at 478-79
(summarizing data from mock jury studies); Roberta K. Flowers. Does It Cost Too Much ?A 'Dtfference'
Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 FORDHAi L. REv. 491. 516-20 (1995) (summanzing social science and
literary materials); Sheri Lynn Johnson. Black Innocence and the Whire Jun. 83 MICi. L REv 1611.
1625-43 (1985) (same). But see Nancy S. Marder. Beyond Gender Peremptory Challenges and the Roles
of the Jury, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1041, 1080 (1995) (disputing predictive value of group affiliation for voting
preferences).
80. See King, supra note 79. at 81-85.
81. See id. at 88; see also Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encouniters"-Sonie Prelunnan Thoughts
About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter'. 26 VAL. U. L REv 243. 250-62 (1991)
(analyzing relations between African-American men and police): Richard A. Wasserstrom. Racism. Seutism.
and Preferential Treatment. An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581. 598 (1977) (descnbing
unconscious racial prejudice based on perceptions of police behasior)
82. See King, supra note 79, at 88-89.
83. See id. at 95-98. Jury sentencing, even in the noncapital context. is still permitted in some
circumstances in Arkansas, Kentucky, and Texas. See ARK CODE ANN § 54-103 (Michic 1993)
(permitting jury sentencing of defendants convicted of felony after jury inal). KY REv STAT ANN §
532.055(2) (Michie Supp. 1994) (same); 3A Tex. CRII. PROC. CODE ANs. § 37 07(2Xb) (Vest Supp
1996) (permitting jury sentencing only on election of defendant)
84. See REID HASTIE E" AL, INSIDE THE JURY 140-42 (1983); Marder. supra note 79. at 1070-73
(citing studies suggesting difference between men's and women's assessments of reliability of eyewitness
identifications).
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The verdict of public opinion also seems to favor the Batson critics on the
question of whether group affiliation is a rational predictor of juror
perspective.85 One need only have witnessed the nationwide reaction to the
verdicts in the two prosecutions of the Los Angeles police officers who beat
Rodney King in order to know that the public believes that the racial makeup
of juries matters. Similarly, when two California juries failed to convict
brothers Erik and Lyle Menendez for killing their parents, much public
discussion and outcry centered on the gender of the jurors and on the male-
female split in the jurors' receptivity to the defendants' allegations of sexual
and emotional abuse.16 In addition, the media commonly report on the racial
and gender composition of juries.8 7 For example, in the murder prosecution
of O.J. Simpson, media coverage during jury selection emphasized the race and
gender of the prospective jurors.88 Each time a juror was dismissed during the
trial, the media immediately reported the effect that the dismissal had on the
racial and gender composition of the jury.89 When Simpson was acquitted, the
media again focused heavily on the race and gender of the jurors."
Public opinion conforms to the observations of social science: race and
gender are rational, even if grossly imperfect, proxies for perspective.9 The
85. Some might argue that the public's opinion on this issue is the most important of all, since it is
the public that must ultimately accept or reject criminal verdicts as reliable pronouncements on basic moral
questions. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641, 680-81 (1996)
(arguing that "the public trial was designed ... to satisfy the public that truth had prevailed at trial" and
to be "confidence-enhancing"). On the subject of the public acceptance of jury verdicts and the jury's
public role, see Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118, 145-52 (1987); Marder, supra note 79, at 1052-63, 1077, 1095; Charles Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357,
1366-69 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Female Jurors Assert Sexism Hurt Menendez Deliberations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994,
at A13; Amy Wallace & Bob Pool, Jurors' Rift Emerged Early and Ran Deep, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994,
at Al.
When the Menendez brothers were convicted by a single jury at their retrial, press reports noted that
unlike the earlier juries, which had broken down into "cliques" largely along gender lines, the seven-man,
five-woman jury on retrial "seem[ed] to get along." Ann W. O'Neill, Menendez Retrial Plays Differently,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al; see also Ann W. O'Neill, Menendezes Are Found Guilty of Killing
Parents, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al.
87. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 n.1 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting frequent
use of phrase "all white jury" in major newspapers).
88. See, e.g., Tony Freemantle, Jury Makeup Favors Simpson, Experts Say: Eight of 71velve Picked
to Hear Case Are Black, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1994, at 5; Janet Gilmore & Mark Katehes, More, Men,
Latinos in Simpson Alternate Jury Pool, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 1994, at N6; Mark Katches & Janet
Gilmore, Jury Pool's Racial Composition Favors Simpson, Analysts Say, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. I, 1994,
at NI; Mostly Black and Female Jurors Make Up Alternate O.J. Panel, Fr. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,
Dec. 9, 1994, at 3A; Roger Simon, Poor Blacks May Hold Simpson's Fate, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 12, 1994,
at IA.
89. See, e.g., Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Criminalist Concedes Errors; Panelist Ousted, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1995, at Al (dismissing juror "did not change the gender or ethnic makeup of the panel ... as one
black woman was replaced with another").
90. See, e.g., A Profile of the Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al l.
91. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 169 n.65 ("(Jiust as blacks and whites may favor Jesse Jackson
for President in different ratios, blacks and whites may-if regarded collectively and statistically-approach
the issues that arise in some criminal cases differently."); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal
Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV.
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Court's suggestion to the contrary in Batson and its progeny is untrue to
decades of judicial efforts to open the jury to excluded groups, to the findings
of social science, and to the beliefs of the public, who must either accept or
reject jury verdicts as reliable resolutions of important moral questions.
Ill. HARMLESS ERROR, RELIABILITY, AND THE RISE OF THE SCIENTISTIC
VERDICT
While clinging to the view that group affiliation is a rational predictor of
juror perspective, the Court's conservative core of Batson critics has also been
busy overseeing a revolution in the law of criminal appellate remedies. Where
constitutional error in the investigation or prosecution of a criminal case once
triggered automatic appellate reversal on direct appeal, regardless of the impact
of that error on the jury's verdict, very nearly the opposite is now true. Where
the Court once exercised the power of appellate review to enforce respect for
a great number of the values served by the criminal process, it now exercises
that power to protect only one value: reliable truthfinding. The tale of this
turnabout has been told before,92 but it bears summarizing here, for it has
serious ramifications for the views of both the champions and the critics of the
Batson norm.
Through the end of the nineteenth century, the remedy for error in the
American appellate courts was the remedy known at English common law:
automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction.93 Reversal was the remedy
regardless of how trivial or technical the error was. Needless to say, this made
for some downright silly results. Justice Traynor, in his book on harmless
error, tells of a California case, People v. St. Clair," in which the appellate
court reversed a conviction because the indictment, alleging the defendant's
entry into a building with intent to commit larceny, omitted the letter "n" from
the word "larceny.
95
The silliness of certain outcomes under this common-law rule should not,
however, blind us to what the rule revealed about the nature of the criminal
process. In such a regime, where all sorts of errors resulted in automatic
reversal, appellate courts used the remedy of reversal to enforce a very broad
range of values in the criminal process. For example, reversal was appropriate
for an error which offended an important constitutional value such as the
L. REv. 808, 834 n.165 (1989); Ogletree. supra note I I. at 1104 ("[Tlhe roles and life exprences of men
and women ... are still unfortunately different enough that it is rational to belteve that randomly selected
women will view a case differently from randomly selected men ").
92. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: 77te Harm of Appl'img Harnless Error to
Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152. 156-61 (1991).
93. See id. at 156.
94. 56 Cal. 406 (1880).
95. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3-4 (1970) (citing St Clair. 56 Cal
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individual's right not to incriminate himself,96 even if that error did not have
the slightest impact on any other value in the criminal process, such as the
discovery of truth.97 In other words, the common-law rule of automatic
reversal reflected a belief that the criminal process served a great number of
important values, and that the sanction of reversal protected those values
embedded in the criminal process for their own sake.
As might be expected, however, cases like St. Clair prompted doubt about
whether appellate courts should enshrine correct spelling as an important value
in the criminal process. Public pressure mounted for a rule that would permit
a conviction to stand when the error in the trial court was trivial.9" Congress
responded to this pressure in 1919, when it enacted a harmless error rule for
cases in the federal courts.99 All fifty states did the same, eventually enacting
their own harmless error rules for proceedings in their courts." The
Supreme Court, however, continued to abide by the old rule of automatic
reversal for constitutional error when it reviewed state criminal cases on direct
appeal. 'o
The Court's landmark 1967 opinion in Chapman v. California"° marked
the end of the old rule of automatic reversal. In Chapman, the Court reviewed
the robbery, kidnapping, and murder convictions of two defendants who had
declined to testify in their own defense at their state court trial. 0 3 The
prosecutor had commented extensively on their silence in his summation to the
jury. Though this sort of prosecutorial comment enjoyed the full blessing of
California's constitution,' 1 4 the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v.
California-issued while the Chapman case was still on appeal-condemned
it as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.").
97. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-19 (1963) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
98. See Ogletree, supra note 92, at 156.
99. See Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181. The idea contained in that Act survives both
in the federal statute books and in the federal rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994) ("On the hearing of any
appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."); FED, R. CRIM.
P. 52(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.").
100. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) ("All 50 States have harmless-error statutes
or rules.").
101. See id. at 42-45 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
102. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
103. See id. at 19, 24-26.
104. The Chapman Court noted:
At the time of the trial, Art. I, § 13 of the State's Constitution provided that 'in any criminal
case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony
any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.'
Id. at 19 (quoting CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5 Thus, when the Chapman
case arrived in the Supreme Court, it presented a plain and unmistakable
constitutional error.
Under the then-prevailing rule, that was all the Supreme Court needed to
know: the remedy for constitutional error was automatic reversal.' The
Court, however, used the Chapman case to craft a harmless error rule for
direct review of state court convictions."0 7 Recognizing the usefulness of a
rule that would "block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that
have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial,""41 the
Court determined that it was necessary to inquire whether there was a
"'reasonable possibility"' that the error "'might have contributed to the
conviction. '""0' Chapman narrowed the range of values in the criminal
process that deserved protection through the sanction of automatic reversal on
appeal. The "result of the trial""0 began to eclipse the details of the trial
process itself as the lodestar value of the criminal justice system.
Since Chapman, the Court has added one constitutional error after another
to the list of errors amenable to harmless error analysis."' In doing so, the
Court has made unmistakably clear what it first intimated in
Chapman-namely, that "the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."" 2 Criminal trials
must be "reliabl[e] . . . vehicle[s] for determination of guilt or innocence.""'
105. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. 613-15 (1965) The Fifth Amendment was made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Aallo'. H 1ogan. 378 U S I (1964)
106. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 42-45 (Stewart. J., concurng in judgment)
107. There was something contrived about using Chapman for this purpose. since the Court vcnt on
to hold that the Griffin error in the case was not harmless. See id at 24-26, One might have expected the
Court to wait to craft a harmless error rule in a case where the rule actually made a difference Still. the
gratuitous Chapman rule has never been treated as dictum.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut. 375 US 85. 86-87 (1%3)1 The Court has created
considerable confusion in the lower courts by continually reformulating the Chapman harmilcss error
standard in subsequent cases. See Martha A. Field. Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutonal
Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale. 125 U. PA. L. REv 15 (1976); Gregory Mitchell. Against
"Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review . 82 CAL. L REV 1335.
1341-47 (1994); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton. Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error. 88 COLL.t L REV
79, 126-42 (1988).
110. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
111. Chief Justice Rehnquist included an exhaustive list of these errors (as of 1991) in his opinion in
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991) (Rehnquist. CJ. for Court in part and dissenting in
part). Since Fulminante, the list has continued to lengthen. See Brecht v. Abrahamson. 113 S Ct 1710,
1713-14 (1993) (holding prosecution's use of defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes
amenable to harmless error review); Yates v. Evatt. 500 U.S. 391, 402 (1991) (applhing harmless error
analysis to taint of unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction)
112. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673. 681 (1986) (citing United States ' Nobles. 422 U S 225.
230 (1975)).
113. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570. 577-78 (1986) (citing Possell v Alabama. 287 U S 45 (1932)) For
a detailed analysis of the Court's shift to a reliability-based model of criminal procedure. see Tom Stacy.
The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure. 91 COLUM. L RE" 1369 (1991) See also
King, supra note 79, at 116 (noting that "the goal of ensuring the factual accuracy and reliability of
criminal convictions and sentences. . .has become the dri ing force behind much of the criminal procedure
jurisprudence of the present Court"); Ogletree. supra note 92. at 162 ("[Alccuracy in the determination of
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Harmless error analysis, according to the Court, is "essential to preserve" this
"'central purpose' of the criminal trial:1 4 Only when errors seriously
undermine the truthfinding function do they merit reversal on appeal.
Chapman itself did not singlehandedly eliminate all values other than
reliability from protection through appellate reversal. Indeed, the Chapman
Court made clear that certain errors undermined rights "so basic to a fair
trial" s that a court need not even examine the impact of those errors on the
reliability of the verdict before reversing a conviction. Among these rights the
Court placed the right to counsel, the right to the suppression of coerced
confessions, and the right to an unbiased judge.1 6 What the Chapman Court
did not say, however, was precisely why those types of errors should not be
subject to harmless error analysis. Was it because those errors vitiated values
that were important enough, in and of themselves, to deserve protection
through the sanction of reversal? Or was it because those errors presumptively
did such great damage to the value of reliability that reviewing courts could
safely be spared the formality of harmless error analysis?
The Court suggested an answer to this important question in the early
1980s. In the landmark case of Strickland v. Washington,'1 7 the Court fixed
a standard of minimal effectiveness for the "counsel" to which a criminal
defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment. tt8 The Court noted that in
defining "effective assistance of counsel," it had to take the "purpose [of that
constitutional requirement]-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide."'' 9 The
Court continued: "This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."'"2
Hence reliability does not supplement or result from fairness; it equates with
fairness. Strickland supplied a significant hint that values of fair process were
guilt is the value that matters most to the Court in the criminal context."); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual
Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 436, 437 (1980) (noting that Burger Court's rhetoric "focused on the need to reorient the criminal
justice system toward a model designed primarily to achieve accurate factual determinations of guilt or
innocence in individual cases").
114. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681).
115. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
116. See id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confessions); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (unbiased
judge)). Indeed, on this point, the Chapman Court was unanimous: All nine Justices agreed that these three
types of error could never be harmless. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 42-44 (Stewart, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 52 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
118. The Court held that a defendant seeking to prove that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective
must prove that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688,
and must also show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different," id. at 694.
119. Id. at 686.
120. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
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losing their intrinsic worth, and were instead becoming means to the ultimate
end of verdict reliability.'
The Court turned this hint into unambiguous law in Arizona v.
Fulminante.'2 There the Court took back something that it seemed to have
given in Chapman: It held that the admission into evidence of a coerced
confession is subject to harmless error analysis.'2 The Court changed its
mind about coerced confessions because it decided that a record on appeal
could adequately show whether an improperly admitted confession undermined
the reliability of the verdict as a statement of truth.' 2 The Court
acknowledged that obtaining confessions through coercion is "reprehensible"
police conduct that undermines deep constitutional values.'2 The Court
simply believed that these were not the values that appellate reversal exists to
protect. Convictions should be reversed only when errors undermine the value
of verdict reliability.
The Court did continue to insist that a certain (very small) group of so-
called "structural" constitutional errors should still merit automatic reversal.
These "structural" errors--"structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards"' 26-are
distinguished from the much larger number of so-called "trial errors," which
permit harmless error analysis. "Structural" errors include the total deprivation
of the right to counsel, the lack of an impartial judge, the denial of the right
to self-representation at trial, the denial of the right to a public trial, and the
exclusion of members of a defendant's race from a grand jury."V By
121. For a persuasive account of the Court's growing "preoccupation with reliabiltty- in its criminal
procedure decisions of the 1980s, see Stacy & Dayton. supra note 109. at 82-88.
122. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
123. Fulminante produced a somewhat confusing alignment of Justices in its several opinions The net
result was that Fulminante's confession was held to have been coerced, but the admission of that confession
was held not to be harmless error. A majority of the Court (Justices White. Marshall. Blackmun. Stevens.
and Scalia) held that Fulminante's confession was coerced. See id. at 287. A different majority (Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy. and Souter) held that notwithstanding contrary
language in Chapman, the admission of coerced confessions should be subjected to harmless error analysts.
See id at 306-12; id. at 313-14 (Kennedy, J.. concurring in judgment). Yet a third majority (Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy) held that on the facts of this case. the admission of
Fulminante's confession was not harmless. See id. at 295-302; id. at 313-14 (Kennedy. J.. concumng in
judgment).
In its method of subjecting coerced confessions to harmless error analysis. Fulminante presents an
odd parallel to Chapman. In Chapman, where the Court first adopted a harmless error rule, the Court need
not have formulated a harmless error rule at all, since the Justices were of the view that the prosecutor's
summation comments on the defendants' fallure to testify were unquestionably harmful. See supra text
accompanying note 106. In Fulminantre. four of the five Justices who agreed that harmless error analysis
should apply to the admission of coerced confessions were also of the view that there was no error in the
case at all--that is, that the confession was not coerced. Consequently. much of the groundbrcaking law
of harmless error has been made by Justices who. under the terms of their own analysis, need not have
reached the question of harmless error at all.
124. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist. CJ.. for Court in part and dissenting in pan).
125. Id. at 311 (Rehnquist, C.J., for Court in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 309 (Rehnquist, CJ., for Court in part and dissenting in part).
127. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., for Court in pan and dissenting in part) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery. 474
U.S. 254, 264 (1986) (grand jury discrimination); Waller v. Georgia. 467 U.S. 39. 49 n.9 (1994) (public
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preserving a small category of automatically reversible constitutional errors, the
Fulminante opinion might be read to suggest that certain important values in
the criminal process other than reliability still qualify for appellate protection
through a rule of per se reversal.
However, Fulminante offers no protection to values other than accurate
fact-finding. Chief Justice Rehnquist made clear that the handful of "structural"
constitutional errors continue to trigger automatic reversal not for their own
sake, but because everyone implicitly understands that such errors always make
verdicts inaccurate.'28 According to Fulminante, a defendant is entitled to
automatic reversal of his conviction upon the complete denial of, for example,
his right to counsel not because the denial of that right offends the values of
dignity or fair play, but because without this "basic protection[], a criminal
trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt
or innocence."' 29 "Structural error," according to the Court, is a specific kind
of flaw in the constitution of the trial mechanism-a flaw the precise effect of
which we cannot measure from a cold appellate record, but which "obviously
affect[s]" the "entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end."'' 30 While
the practice of automatic reversal survives Fulminante, appellate protection of
values other than reliable fact-finding simply does not. 13t
trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (self-representation at trial); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (biased
judge)). The Hillery case is something of an aberration on this list; it is discussed more fully infra Section
IV.D.
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Court added another constitutional error to the list
of errors subject to automatic reversal-a constitutionally deficient instruction on the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Interestingly, however, the Court did not rely primarily on Fudminante's
distinction between "structural" and "trial" errors. Rather, the Sullivan Court held that the trial court's
failure to give an accurate instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt deprived the defendant of a
"jury" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and thereby left the reviewing court without a true
"verdict" on which to perform harmless error analysis. See id. at 277-78. The Court relied on Fulinante's
distinction between "structural" and "trial" error only in passing, as an alternative basis for the decision.
See id. at 278-79. Perhaps the Sullivan Court's reluctance to embrace Fulminante's dichotomy of errors
reflects some of the same discomfort that that schema has created in the law reviews. See, e.g., Linda E.
Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine Misunderstood and Misapplied,
28 GA. L. RIv. 125, 140-43 (1993); Henry Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement,
1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 195, 204; Ogletree, supra note 92, at 162-64; Stephen L. Earnest, Recent Decision,
61 Miss. L.J. 445, 457-58 (1991).
128. See, e.g., Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14 (Ist Cir. 1994) ("In effect, then, the harmfulness of
structural errors can be conclusively presumed."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 940 (1995).
129. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, C.J., for Court in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
130. Id. at 309 (Rehnquist, C.J., for Court in part and dissenting in part); see also Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (holding that structural errors "require[] automatic reversal of
the conviction because they infect the entire trial process"); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986) (noting that some constitutional errors are automatically reversible because their effects are
"fundamental and pervasive" (emphasis added)).
131. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), sits uncomfortably in Fulminante's list of structural
errors requiring automatic reversal. After Fulminante, appellate reversal requires some type of harm to the
reliability of the petit jury's verdict-either demonstrable harm in the case of trial error, or presumable
harm in the case of structural error. The Hillery case, however, concerned the exclusion of blacks from the
grand jury. See id. at 255-56. Modem grand juries are notoriously dependent on, and controlled by, the
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But what exactly is the nature of the "reliability" that the Fulminanre
Court enthrones as the reigning value in the criminal appellate process'? Is it
a process-based reliability, under which a "reliable" verdict is any verdict that
emerges from a trial that rigorously adheres to fair procedures? Or is it instead
an empirical reliability, under which a "reliable" verdict is a verdict that
accurately describes the historical fact of whether the defendant actually
committed the crime?
It is the latter. Fulminante's language at least hints, if it does not
affirmatively state, that the Court had in mind an empirical model of the
criminal verdict. The Court made clear that when a jury determines a
defendant's guilt or innocence-that is, when it performs "'the central purpose
of a criminal trial'-the jury is deciding a "'factual question.""... 2 If a
reliable verdict were simply whatever pronouncement on a defendant's guilt
or innocence a fairly conducted trial happened to produce, it would be odd to
refer to that finding as a "fact."
More importantly, the change in the law that Fuhninante worked shows
clearly that the Court was rejecting a process-based understanding of reliability
for an empiricist understanding. If a reliable conviction were any conviction
obtained through the application of fair trial procedures, then we would expect
the Court to deem verdicts unreliable, and therefore automatically reversible,
whenever fair trial procedures were flaunted. Trial procedures, in other words,
would have value in their own right; they would be the essential determinant
of a reliable verdict. Yet Fulninante is striking precisely because the Court
walked away from this approach. Trial procedures have no intrinsic value for
the Fulminante Court; they merit concern only when their distortion causes a
parallel distortion of the accuracy of the jury's reconstruction of real-world
events. As Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton have argued, this type of reasoning
positively "denigrates" the fair trial rights of criminal defendants.' "
prosecutor. See infra text accompanying note 206. Whatever might be said of the harm that racial exclusion
causes to the verdict pronounced by an independent and autonomous petit jury. the same cannot be said
for the impact of racial exclusion on the indictment produced by a subsertient grand jur) See" anfa Section
IV.D.
The right to self-representation at trial also seems out of place in Fuhmninae's list That constitutional
right, recognized in Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). hardly seems to enhance the reliabilit, of
criminal verdicts. Indeed, it might be seen to do just the opposite If the righi to representation b) trained
counsel is essential to the rigorous process of adversarial testing that % e take to establish truth. as the Court
has said it is, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335. 342-45 (1963). then it is difficult to undertand
how the right of a layperson to refuse trained counsel and go it alone does not frustrate this search
Nonetheless, the Court has continued to treat the dental of the right to self-represenitation as a -structural
error requiring reversal. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168. 177 n.8 (1984) ('Since the right of self-
representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfasorable
to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to 'harmless error' analysis."). The rule of automatic resersal
for denial of the right to self-representation is at odds with the single-minded focus on rehable %erdicts that
animates Fulminante and most of the Court's other criminal procedure cases of the last lifteen )ears
132. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 (Rehnquist. CJ.. for Court in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673. 681 (1986)) (emphasis added)
133. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 109, at 80-41. Stacy and Dayton sere not here refemng to
Fulminante, as their excellent article preceded that decision They 'sere. hoeser. referrng to a number
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Fulminante's reasoning establishes what the language of the opinion intimates:
A "reliable" verdict is a verdict that accurately describes the historical truth
about the defendant's involvement in, and responsibility for, the crime.
Fulminante, moreover, was not decided in a vacuum. It was decided at a
time when the same majority that favored the extension of harmless error
analysis to coerced confessions was also busily reforming the law of habeas
corpus. There too, in the habeas setting, these Justices have clearly articulated
an empiricist understanding of the nature of the criminal verdict., 34 As
Justice O'Connor stated in her plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane,' 35 the
Court's habeas cases "have moved in the direction of reaffirming the relevance
of the likely accuracy of convictions in determining the available scope of
habeas review."'136 For example, as the Court has raised new bars to federal
courts' consideration of procedurally defaulted claims of constitutional
error 137 and to claims of constitutional error presented in successive federal
habeas petitions, 38 the Court has recognized that a habeas petitioner may
avoid these bars through a colorable claim of "actual innocence" of the crime
or crimes charged. 39 By creating this exception, the Court restricts federal
court review to those state court verdicts that are empirically, demonstrably
false factual findings. To take this step, the Court must believe that criminal.
verdicts are, in essence, empirical findings in the first place.
In Teague itself, where a plurality of the Court stated that it would no
longer announce new rules of constitutional criminal procedure in habeas
cases,140 the Court allowed an exception for only "those new procedures
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished.'' 4t The plurality made plain that the "accurate conviction" it was
seeking to ensure was the accurate conviction of the factually guilty: The
purpose of allowing federal courts to announce new rules of constitutional
of cases from the late 1970s and early- to mid-1980s that suggested the approach to the criminal verdict
that Fulminante adopted. See id. at 80 n.9.
134. See Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 304 (1993) ("As the
Court has narrowed the reach of the writ, it has repeatedly emphasized that the availability of habeas relief
should depend in large measure on whether the petitioner is factually innocent.").
135. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
136. Id. at 313 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
137. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991) (holding that where habeas petitioner
missed filing deadline for direct appeal from state court conviction, federal district court may address claims
of constitutional error only if petitioner can show cause for default and actual prejudice flowing from
claimed error).
138. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (adopting cause-and-prejudice test for
claims of constitutional error not presented in first federal habeas petition).
139. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 862 (1995) (allowing successive petition upon
appropriate showing of actual innocence).
140. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 316. Although Teague produced only a plurality opinion, its rule
has been applied in subsequent majority opinions. See, e.g., Butler v, McKellar, 494 U.S. 407. 409 (1990)
(applying Teague to question of lawfulness of custodial interrogation on particular set of facts); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989) (stating that Teague applies to whether Constitution permits execution
of mentally retarded prisoner).
141. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
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criminal procedure in habeas cases was to "assure that no man has been
incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that
the innocent will be convicted."' 4 2 Thus whatever went unsaid in Fulninante
about the empirical nature of criminal verdicts has been stated quite clearly in
the Court's recent habeas corpus cases.' That statement is nothing short of
an "exaltation"'" of factual accuracy." 5
Fulminante represents the crowning victory in a battle to restrict appellate
remedies for error in the criminal process.'46 Yet it also represents something
deeper: a fundamental commitment to a specific model of the criminal verdict.
By hinging appellate reversal on an impairment of the "reliability" of the
verdict, the Court is saying quite clearly that a criminal verdict is not a
subjective judgment or a socially constructed consensus. A criminal verdict is
142. Id. at 312 (quoting Desist v. United States. 394 U.S 244. 262 (1969) (Harlan. I . dissenting))
see also id. at 320-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (faulting Teague plurality for limiting federal habeas court's
power to announce new rules to "factual innocence" standard).
143. Fulminante is, of course, a case about direct appellate review. rather than collateral review, and
the Court has admittedly made clear that "collateral review is different from direct rcstew " Brecht v
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). Yet the differences between direct and collateral review do
not suggest that the Court has one image of what a criminal verdict is in direct resiew cascs and a
completely different image of the criminal verdict in collateral res ier cases. On collateral resic,. principles
of comity and federalism counsel greater hesitation before a federal reviewing court will disturb a state
criminal conviction. See id. at 1720-21. The Court held in Brecht. for example, that courts should use a
less rigorous harmless error standard in habeas cases than in direct review cases See id at 1721-22
(directing habeas courts to determine whether error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the verdict" rather than whether error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt") This does
not mean, however, that a criminal verdict is any less a finding of historical fact in one setting than the
other. It simply means that a habeas court must treat that finding more deferentially in order to asoid
creating excessive friction between state and federal courts.
144. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens. I , dissenting)
145. I do not mean to suggest that concerns for the factual accuracy of criminal serdicts have dncn
each and every one of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' habeas opinions. Notably, the Court has declined
several significant invitations to eliminate habeas review for claims not directly impugning the factual
accuracy of verdicts. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 US. 680 (1993) (alloving habeas re,ew of
claimed violation of defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S 436 1966)). Rose v Mitchell.
443 U.S. 545 (1979) (allowing habeas review of claim of racial discrimination in selection of grand jury
I do believe, however, that most of the Court's work in the habeas area for the last tuo decades has
been animated by concerns for factual accuracy. See supra note 134 Indeed. I argue in this Article that
the Court's heightened concern for factual accuracy, especially in recent years. has likely undermined the
reasoning in Mitchell. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
146. Of course, this is a victory that has been realized only in the appellate setting Trial courts still
enforce some rules that are designed primarily to deter police misconduct. ir espectie of impact on the
reliability of the jury's factfinding. Obvious examples of such rules are the exclusionary rule. which
requires the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment nghts. are
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). and the rule of Miranda v Artzona. 384 U S 436 (1966). which
forbids the prosecution from using an admission taken from a suspect in police custody who has not been
informed of her constitutional rights to silence and counsel
On appeal, however, the prophylactic and deterrence-based rationales for these rules collapse
Violations of these rules at trial are not automatically reerseble: they arc reversible only if the) harm the
reliability of the verdict. See Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S 279. 292 n.6 (1991) (White. J . for Court in
part and dissenting in part) (citing cases establishing that Miranda violations ac reiewed for harmless
error); Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543. 550 (1968) (holding violations of exclusionary rule subject
to harmless error analysis); cf Nix v. Williams. 467 U S. 431. 443 n.4 (1984) (adopting "i'nevitable
discovery" exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in part on basis of exception', conceptual
similarity to independent source doctrine).
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instead a factual finding that is capable of being "reliable"; it can be "true" in
the same way that the results of a chemistry experiment can be "true." Just as
laboratory error might contaminate an experiment and make its results
unreliable, trial or structural error might contaminate a jury's deliberations and
make its verdict unreliable. This, then, is a major consequence of the
conservative Justices' victory in the harmless error battle-a scientistic
definition of the criminal verdict.1
47
IV. THE CURIOUS HARMLESSNESS OF BATsON ERROR: THE VIEWS OF
BATSON'S PROPONENTS
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the question of whether
a Batson error should trigger harmless error analysis or automatic reversal.'48
147. Mark Cammack has perceptively tied this prevailing view of the criminal verdict to the empiricist
epistemology of the Enlightenment. See Cammack, supra note 29, at 410-15, 422-62; see also Brown,
supra note 27, at 140-47 (discussing "foundationalist" and "antifoundationalist" understandings of jury
decisionmaking). This philosophy of knowledge works from the premise that the world has an objective,
empirical reality independent of the mind of a person observing it. The observer's mind is a blank slate;
it comes to know the world around it only through the observer's senses. What the observer knows is "true"
only to the extent that the observer's mental representation accurately corresponds to the objective,
empirical nature of the thing observed. See Cammack, supra note 29, at 410-15.
Cammack notes that "[iun recent years, the premises of empiricism ... have been subjected to
sustained attack across all of the disciplines they once held." Id. at 415. The main attack has been
"contextualist"--an attack on the notion that a bright line separates the subjective mind of the observer
from the objective world that he observes. See id. at 415-21. This modem epistemology emphasizes the
importance of context to the construction of knowledge, insisting that "representations of reality are shaped
by the values and purposes of their human creators." Id. at 417. Cammack suggests that the entire Court
has clung to the empiricist model of the criminal verdict in Batson and its other jury selection cases. See
id. at 456. I do not agree; I see in the opinions of Batson's opponents a strong-and quite
powerful-commitment to contextualism. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
148. The Court has addressed two related questions. First, in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 255-56
(1986), the Court held that racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors required reversal of the
defendant's conviction, even though the defendant had been properly convicted by a lawfully constituted
petit jury. Whether Hillery should be extended to the Batson setting, and indeed, whether Hillery was
correctly decided, is discussed infra Section IV.D. Second, the Court has determined that Batson does not
apply retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final before Batson was decided. See
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 260 (1986) (per curiam). Part of the Court's rationale was that Batson error
does no serious harm to criminal verdicts. See infra note 187.
One lower federal court has addressed the question of whether Batson error can be harmless on direct
appeal. In United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987), the court, citing Hillery, explicitly
rejected the government's argument that Batson error can be harmless. See id. at 1261. Other federal courts
and judges have suggested that Batson error cannot be Fulminante-style trial error but is instead structural
error. See. e.g., Rosa v. Peters, 36 F3d 625, 634 n.17 (7th Cir. 1994); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F,2d 1215,
1225-26 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992); Blair v. Armontrout, 976 F.2d 1130, 1143 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The state courts have taken conflicting positions. Some have stated that Batson error cannot be
harmless. See, e.g., K.S. v. Carr, 618 So. 2d 707, 711 (Ala. 1993); State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 459
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); cf Exparte Yelder 575 So. 2d 137, 138-39 (Ala. 1991) (requiring court to presume
prejudice on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise Batson objection).
Others have held that Batson error can be harmless in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Macon v. State, 652
So. 2d 331, 333 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (finding Batson error harmless where excused juror would have
been excused in any event to tend to ill relative); State v. Vincent, 755 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (finding black defendant suffered no harm from prosecution's use of all six of its peremptories to
exclude blacks, because jury that was seated still had five blacks); Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d 585, 588
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Arguably, it has resolved the question by inference. In cases such as Batson,
Powers, Edmonson, and J.E.B., where the Court has found a violation of the
Batson norm, it has reversed the conviction or judgment outright without
pausing to assess the harmlessness of the violation." 9 In none of these cases,
though, did the Court explicitly consider the application of harmless error
analysis; it seemed merely to assume that reversal was necessary.'t The
question of the appropriate appellate remedy for Batson error seems to remain
open.' 51
However, even a quick glance at the Court's impassioned rhetoric in its
jury discrimination cases reveals that the Court-or at least the group of
Justices who have devised and extended the Batson rule-considers such
discrimination to be a very serious matter. Jury discrimination, the Court has
said, "offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts,"' 52 "is
at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government,"' 53 and "raises serious questions as to the fairness of [judicial]
proceedings."'-'  Were the Court to be presented with the claim that a Batson
error was harmless, it would likely conclude that a Batson violation is
structural error, to which harmless error analysis does not apply,'" and
would promptly reverse the conviction.
156
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (finding Batson error might be harmless where blacks %ere not significantly
underrepresented on jury compared to percentage in group from which %emre %as draons, re% 'd on other
grounds, 787 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc.
Outside the context of the Batson problem, the Court has selected appellate remedies for certain errors
in jury selection. For example, the Court has held that the erroneous denial of a "for cause" challenge is
not automatically reversible so long as the biased juror is removed by a peremptory challenge See Ross
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86-88 (1988). The circuits are split on whether the erroneous dental of a
peremptory challenge on other than Batson grounds should be automatically resersible See. e.g. Kirk v
Raymark Indus., 61 F.3d 147, 158-62 (3d Cir. 1995) (yes): United States v. Annigom. 57 F3d 739. 745
(9th Cir. 1995) (no); see also infra note 294 (describing Anigom).
149. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986): Powers % Ohio. 499 L S 400. 416 11991)
(reversing conviction); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.. 500 US. 614. 631 (1991 tresersing
judgment); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419. 1430 (1994) (reversing judgment). see also
Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (noting that Court has "'recognized that discrimination in the jury selection process
may lead to the reversal of a conviction").
150. Sometimes the parties invited the Court to make this assumption, in Poiers. the State conceded
that the conviction should be reversed if the Court accepted the white defendant's argument that he had
standing to object to the dismissal of black jurors. See Powers. 499 U S at 416.
151. But see Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159. 169 (1992) (Blackmun. J. concumng) (placing
Batson error on list of errors to which Court has refused to apply harmless error analy sis
152. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
153. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (holding that facially race-neutral system for grand jury
selection was applied in illegally discriminatory manner).
154. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
155. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279. 309-10 (1991) (Rehnquist. CJ . for Court in part and
dissenting in part).
156. This is precisely what the Court has said of the error of discnmination in the selection of grand
jurors. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, CJ.. for Court in part and dissenting in pan). Vasquez
v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-63 (1986). But see infra Section IVD (arguing that reasoning of Hiller,
decision is unpersuasive and obsolete).
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This conclusion would be too prompt. For as I will show, 57 Batson
error, as Batson's proponents on the Court have defined it, cannot be structural
error. This does not mean that Batson error is error of the other Fulminante
sort: trial error, to which harmless error analysis does apply. Rather, Batson's
proponents have defined the Batson norm in such a way that a Batson violation
is absolutely harmless in every case. A Batson violation causes harm, of
course, but it does not cause harm to any value that appellate reversal exists
to protect. Thus the Court, presented with the question of whether to apply
harmless error analysis to a Batson violation, would be driven to the odd
position that Batson error should trigger not automatic reversal, but automatic
affirmance. '58
To see why this is so, consider who gets harmed by a Batson violation,
and how.' 59 There are three possible victims of the discriminatory exercise
of peremptory challenges: the defendant, t60 the excluded juror,'6' and the
community. 162 The Court has identified three distinct kinds of harm that one
or more of these victims 163 can suffer from jury discrimination. The first of
these is the core equal protection harm of stigma.' 64 As the Court observed
in its very first jury discrimination case, Strauder v. West Virginia,165 the
exclusion of jurors on account of their race "is practically a brand upon them,
affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."'166 Where the
defendant and the excluded juror are of the same minority race, they share in
this stigmatic injury.
167
157. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
158. When I say "automatic affirmance," I do not mean that all cases presenting Batson error must
be affirmed on appeal. Cases presenting Batson error might also present some other kind of error that does
in fact warrant reversal. What I am suggesting is simply that a Batson violation-as currently defined-can
never supply a reason for reversing a conviction.
159. For a careful student-written analysis of the possible types and victims of Batson error, see David
Zonana, Note, The Effect of Assumptions About Racial Bias on the Analysis of Batson 's Three Harms and
the Peremptory Challenge, 1994 ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 203.
160. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986).
161. See id. at 87.
162. See id. at 87-88.
163. Not every instance of jury discrimination will victimize all three of these individuals or groups.
For example, in a McCollum situation, where the defendant himself engages in illegal discrimination, the
defendant may not be the one harmed. In this situation, the Court has made clear that the important
interests at stake are those of the jurors and the community. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-50
(1992).
164. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1976) (noting that courts heighten scrutiny of racial classifications
because such classifications cause stigmatic harm to targeted groups); Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 349-55 (1987).
165. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
166. Id. at 308.
167. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986).
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The second kind of injury that the Court has identified is the injury to the
excluded juror's equal protection right not to be excluded from a jury on
account of race or gender. 6 The Court has made clear that '[a]n individual
juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she
does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.""'q
This right has been the engine of much of the post-Batson development of the
Batson norm. 70
Finally, the third kind of injury that the Court has traced to jury
discrimination is injury to the trial itself. This injury takes two related forms.
On the one hand, the Court has suggested that Batson error directly
undermines the defendant's right to a fair trial.'' On the other hand, the
Court has said that Batson violations "undermine public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice."'' 72 According to the Court, Batson error
subverts both the actual fairness of the trial, in which the defendant has an
interest, and the appearance of fairness, in which the community has an
interest.
In sum, the Court has seen Batson error as causing some mix of stigmatic,
participational, and fairness harms to defendants, excluded jurors, and the
community. The trouble for Batson's proponents on the Court is that in a post-
Fulminante world, none of the harms that Batson's proponents identify should
trigger a rule of automatic reversal on appeal. Indeed, they should trigger
precisely the opposite rule, that of automatic affirmance.
A. Stigma
Discriminatory peremptory challenges undoubtedly cause the very sort of
stigmatic injury that the Court identified and condemned in Strauder. As the
Strauder Court noted:
[It is difficult to] maintain[] that compelling a colored man to submit
to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the
State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color
alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him
of equal legal protection."'
168. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
169. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400. 409 (1991).
170. The Court's decisions in McCollum,. Edmonson. and Powers all rested primarily on the excluded
juror's rights. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1992): Edmonson v Lccs% ie Concrete Co.
500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); Powers, 499 U.S. at 409. According to Barbara Under%%ood. this is precisely
as it should be. See Underwood, supra note 43, at 742-50 (arguing that jurors' equal protection rights
provide proper basis for Batson and its progeny).
171. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411-12; Batson, 476 U.S at 86-87
172. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; see also McCollum. 505 U S at 49-50 (explaining harm that Batson
violations cause to public confidence in administration of justice. especially in racc-related cases)
173. Strauder v. West Virginia. 100 U.S. 303. 309 (1879)
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Particularly in a traditional Batson scenario, where the defendant and the
excluded juror are of the same race or gender (as opposed to a Powers
scenario, where they are not), both individuals suffer harm: the
"brand[ing]"' 74 of their race or gender as unfair, incompetent, biased, or
inferior.
This is a very real and a very cruel harm. The trouble is, it is the wrong
kind. Appellate reversal does not exist to make the world a nicer place; it
exists to guarantee the reliability of criminal verdicts. 75 This is the central
message of Fulminante,7 6 in which government agents caused a very real
injury to an important value-indeed, a constitutional value, the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right not to implicate himself. The Court acknowledged that
this injury was serious, 177 but it declined to deter that injury and bolster the
underlying Fifth Amendment value with a rule of automatic reversal. What was
true for the Fifth Amendment in Fulminante should also be true for the
Fourteenth on a Batson appeal. Stigmatic injury is injury to the central value
in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but no matter
how serious that injury may be, the remedy of appellate reversal does not exist
to deter it.'
78
B. Participation in the Criminal Justice System
Precisely the same is true of the second type of Batson harm-injury to
the excluded juror's right to equal participation in the criminal justice system.
The Court has waxed eloquent about this right, quoting de Tocqueville for the
view that the jury "invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards society; and
the part which they take in the Government."'' 79 Batson violations, according
174. Id. at 308.
175. See supra notes 108-47 and accompanying text (explaining development of Court's view that
only non-harmless error is reversible).
176. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
177. See id. at 311-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., for Court in part and dissenting in part).
178. l am here describing how the rule of appellate reversal appears to operate in the post-Fultninante
world. I am not making a normative argument that appellate reversal ought not be available to remedy the
stigmatic injury occasioned by racial discrimination in jury selection. In my view, Falminante was a
mistake; the appellate process ought to protect more values than just verdict reliability. Nevertheless, the
Court decided otherwise in Fulminante, and we must now assess the impact of that case's narrowing of the
function of appellate reversal on all varieties of trial error, including Batson error.
179. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 334-37 (Schocken ed., Ist ed. 1961)). The Powers Court also noted that the jury system
"'postulates a conscious duty of participation in the machinery of justice,"' id. at 406 (quoting Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)), and that "[j]ury service preserves the democratic element of the
law," id. at 407.
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to the Court, "foreclose[] a significant opportunity [for the excluded jurors] to
participate in civic life," and thereby violate the Equal Protection Clause."W
And there, again, is the rub: Convictions are not reversed to deter
violations of the Equal Protection Clause.'' From the standpoint of an
appellate court reviewing a criminal conviction in a post-Fulminante world, a
prosecutor's illegal courtroom decision to dismiss a juror on account of race
or gender should have the same consequences for the defendant as that
prosecutor's illegal office decision to fire a secretary on account of race or
gender. In both instances, the prosecutor has offended deep and important
equal protection values. But when the appellate court reviews a criminal
conviction, it does not police those values for their own sake; it polices the
reliability of the verdict. The harm to the excluded juror's equal protection
rights thus should not result in a rule of automatic reversal of the defendant's
conviction; it should result in the opposite.
C. The Fairness of the Trial-Actual and Perceived
As noted above, the Court has also condemned Batson error for damaging
the defendant's right to a fair trial and the community's interest in a criminal
justice system that appears to run fairly. 8 2 Of the several kinds of injury that
the Court has traced to Batson, these injuries would seem to provide the Court
with the sturdiest foundation for concluding that Batson error is Fulminante-
style "structural" error subject to a rule of automatic reversal. Yet the
sturdiness of this foundation is illusory: Batson and its progeny simply do not
support the conclusion that jury discrimination undermines the fairness of
trials. Indeed, the cases support precisely the opposite conclusion.
1. The Actual Fairness of the Trial
From the outset, the Court has been cavalier in asserting, yet timid in
explaining, the fair trial impact of Batson error. In Batson itself, the Court said
briefly that the fair trial harm of jury discrimination is that it "denies [the
defendant] the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure."' 1
Because the jury is supposed to be "'indifferently chosen, ""' jury
discrimination violates "the very idea of a jury."'8 5 This rather cryptic and
180. See id. at 409. See generally Underwood. supra note 43, at 745-47 (elaborating on parttcipational
injury caused by exclusion from jury service).
181. See infra note 196.
182. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
183. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
184. Id. at 87 (quoting 4 WILIAM BL.ACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 1350)
185. Id. at 86. Of course, if this is the true harm that Batson error causes to the fairness of trals. then
the Court seems to have lost its nerve just four years later in Holland %. Illinois. when it held that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of an "impartial jury" does not forbid discnmination in the selection of petit juries-
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undeveloped suggestion in Batson is the closest that the Court has ever come
to identifying any real impact that Batson error has on the actual fairness of
trials. 8 6 In its cases following and extending Batson, the Court has shied
away from the claim that jury discrimination actually makes trials unfair,
instead retreating to vague assertions about the appearance of fairness." 7 In
Powers v. Ohio,88 for example, the Court had to establish that a white
defendant suffered cognizable injury from the exclusion of black jurors in
order to hold that the defendant had standing to lodge a Batson objection. This
was the moment for the Court to state explicitly how racially discriminatory
peremptories actually damage the fairness of criminal trials. Yet the Court
could muster nothing more specific than this: "[R]acial discrimination in the
selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process,' ...
places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt .... [and] invites
cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the
law."'' 8 9 "Placing in doubt" and "inviting cynicism" are defects in the
appearance, not the reality, of fairness. Thus, in Powers, what had originally
been two discrete forms of injury-injury to the defendant's right to a fair trial
and injury to the community's interest in a process that appears fair-collapsed
into the weaker of the two injuries, the injury to appearance.
Why has the Court been so reluctant to describe the fair trial impact of
Batson error? The reason is simple: The Batson cases themselves say that there
is no such impact. As explained above, 90 the Court in Batson and its
progeny has continually and stridently rejected the theory of difference-the
theory that an attorney might rationally infer something about a prospective
juror's perspective from his or her group affiliation. Race and gender are not
merely illegal but false proxies for viewpoint. This means that when a black
woman is removed from the jury because of her race and gender, and is
See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,478,487 (1990). For a discussion of Holland, see infra Section VI.B.
186. The Court's unease in stating and defining the fair trial impact of Batson error may stem from
the fact that Batson and its progeny are equal protection cases. In using equal protection to guarantee fair
trials, the Court has pressed the Equal Protection Clause into a criminal-process service to which it is not
obviously suited. See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. The more obvious textual anchor for an
effort to ensure full representation of the community on the petit jury is the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of an impartial jury in all criminal cases. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Court, however, has not
interpreted that language in this way. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 272-303.
187. In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam), the Court addressed whether Batson should
apply retroactively to convictions that had become final before Batson was decided. Part of the Court's
inquiry was whether Batson had been "'designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials."' Id. at 259
(quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 (1984)). On this score, the Allen Court merely noted that "the
rule in Batson may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial." Id. at 259 (emphasis
added). But the Court much more confidently asserted that Batson "strengthens public confidence in the
administration of justice." Id.
188. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
189. Id. at 411-12 (citation omitted).
190. See supra Part II.
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replaced by a white man, nothing is lost. 9 ' The new juror is presumptively
as fair and impartial as the one who was excused. As Justice Scalia objected
in his dissent in J.E.B., this approach views jurors as "fungible."' 92 A Batson
violation by definition has no impact on the jury or on the quality of the jury's
deliberations. In all important ways, Batson error leaves the jury
unchanged.'93
Fulminante's concept of "structural error," moreover, is of no help to the
Court. A Batson violation is admittedly a "structural defect(] in the constitution
of the trial mechanism," which is one of Fulninante's criteria for structural
error.' 94 But this structural defect is harmless in every case. True structural
error, which warrants a rule of automatic reversal under Fulminante, not only
alters the constitution of the trial mechanism, but also "obviously affect(s]" the
"entire conduct of the trial" from start to finish.'95 In other words, structural
error is error whose damaging effect on the reliability of verdicts we cannot
measure from a cold record but can simply presume. By rejecting the theory
of difference, Batson forecloses exactly that presumption. '9 Having defined
away the only possible harm that could qualify a Batson violation as structural
error, Batson's proponents are left with only one odd and counterintuitive
option: They must ignore the violation and affirm the conviction.
2. The Perceived Fairness of the Trial
Batson's champions on the Court cannot escape this conundrum by
asserting that a rule of automatic reversal is necessary to protect the
community's (as distinct from the defendant's) interest in the appearance (as
distinct from the reality) of a fair trial. In the first place, Fulininante tells us
quite clearly that appellate reversal is reserved for real impairments to the
191. For a suggestion that this odd result flows from Strauder %- West Urginia. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
see Zonana. supra note 159. at 209-10.
192. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.. 114 S. Ct. 1419. 1437 (1991) (Scalia. J . disscnting)
193. I should make clear here that I am not arguing that this conclusion about the fair trial harm of
Batson error is correct. In fact. I make the opposite claim in Part VI. I am arguing here only that this
counterintuitive conclusion about the fair trial harm of Batson error flows from the Batson Court's
premises, taken together with the Fulminante approach to appellate remedies
194. See Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279. 309 (1991)
195. Id. at 309-10.
196. Indeed, it does more: it seems to undermine Strauder itself. Strauder was a direct appeal from
a criminal conviction obtained from a jury from which all blacks had been excluded by law The Court
automatically reversed the conviction, without evaluating the harmfulness of the equal protection ,iolation
to the reliability of the verdict. See Strauder v. West Virginia. 100 U.S 303. 312 (1879)
Fulminante, of course, requires actual or presumed harm to the reliability of the verdict as a condition
of appellate reversal. Batson's proponents on the Court suggest that there is. by definition, no such harm.
Under current law, then, it would seem (startlingly) that Strauder was wrongly decided on the question of
remedy-that the Court wrongly deployed a rule of automatic reversal to police an equal protection norm
that had nothing to do with the factual reliability of verdicts. The same would be true of Whitu % Georgia.
385 U.S. 545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas. 347 U.S. 475 (1954); and Parton v Aitesussippt. 332 U.S. 463
(1947), in all of which the Court reversed convictions to punish equal protection violations in jury selection.
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value of verdict reliability, not speculative ones. While the public might
believe that jury discrimination makes verdicts unreliable, the Court's rejection
of the theory of difference in the Batson line of cases means that Batson's
proponents think the public is simply wrong. Nowhere has the Court suggested
that reversal is appropriate simply because the public mistakenly believes that
a particular error impugns the reliability of verdicts. More fundamentally,
nowhere has the Court suggested that appellate reversal serves the value of
appearance, or the value of public trust and confidence in the criminal justice
system. Coerced confessions surely undermine public confidence in that
system, yet the Fulminante Court never hinted that the public's interest in an
honest and fair system deserved protection through a rule of automatic
appellate reversal.
Secondly, even if the Court could employ an appellate remedy to protect
the interests of the community without violating Fulminante, this does not
imply that a rule of reversal would be appropriate. The community interest that
the Court identifies in Batson and its progeny is the community's disapproval
of racial prejudice in the administration of justice. 197 This is undoubtedly one
important interest at issue when an appellate court reviews a Batson violation,
but it is not the only one. Does not the community also have a very strong
interest in seeing criminals punished? And if jury discrimination has no impact
on the reliability of verdicts, as the Court's reasoning implies, does not the
community have an interest in ensuring that the correctly convicted criminal
not receive the windfall of a reversal of his conviction? In other words, to the
extent that the community's interests should determine the appropriate
appellate remedy, there are more of them than the Court recognizes, and they
do not all point to a rule of reversal.
D. The Curious Persistence of Vasquez v. Hillery
Some courts and commentators have looked to the Court's 1986 opinion
in Vasquez v. Hillery98 as proof that Batson error would require a rule of
automatic reversal.' 99 However, Hillery and a virtually identical case that
preceded it by about six years, Rose v. Mitchell,2° actually show just the
opposite. In both Mitchell and Hillery, the petitioners sought relief for the
intentional race discrimination in the selection of the grand juries that indicted
them. In Mitchell, the discrimination had allegedly infected the selection of a
197. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
198. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
199. See Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625, 634 n.17 (7th Cir. 1994); Blair v. Armontrout, 976 F.2d 1130,
1143 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Thompson,
827 F.2d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 1987); Batiste v. State, 888 S.W.2d 9. 13-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994);
Herman, supra note 15, at 1831 n.98.
200. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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grand jury foreman; in Hille,, the discrimination had infected the selection of
the entire grand jury. In neither case, however, did the petitioner suggest that
his trial had been unfair or that the petit jury that convicted him had been
unlawfully selected. As might be expected, the State argued in each case that
the lawfully obtained conviction at trial cured any equal protection error at the
grand jury stage. In both instances, the Court rejected the State's harmless
error argument.
The Court's rationale shifted tellingly in the years between the two cases.
In Mitchell, the Court's reason for choosing a rule of automatic reversal was
the obvious one: "Because discrimination on the basis of race in the selection
of members of a grand jury ... strikes at the fundamental values of our
judicial system and our society as a whole,"2' a rule of automatic reversal
was necessary to enforce "the strong policy the Court consistently has
recognized of combatting racial discrimination in the administration of
justice. ''20 2 There was no pretense in Mitchell that racial discrimination in the
selection of grand jurors required a rule of automatic reversal because that
discrimination seriously impugned the reliability of the petit jury's ultimate
conviction. The Court simply recognized automatic reversal to be the best
possible deterrent of equal protection violations embedded in the charging
process.
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Hillery, by contrast, is almost
nothing but pretense. By 1986, it was only barely tenable for the Court to
suggest that a conviction should be reversed to deter an equal protection
violation that did not have concrete impact on the reliability of the conviction.
Fulminante had not yet been decided, but the writing was plainly on the
wall.20 3 Justice Marshall therefore mentioned the outmoded reasoning of
Mitchell only in passing.2' Instead, he attempted to show that discrimination
in the selection of grand jurors actually has a concrete impact on the reliability
of verdicts. His argument was that a grand jury selected without regard to race
might choose to indict a defendant on lesser charges or fewer counts or might
choose not to indict at all.2 5 To any criminal practitioner, this theory of
harm is unpersuasive. Perhaps grand juries were once the independent bodies
that Justice Marshall described, but they surely are not now. Except in the
rarest of cases, grand juries vote "yea" or "'nay" on an indictment that has been
framed by the prosecutor, and almost invariably vote "yea." It is often said that
a modem grand jury would, if asked by the prosecutor, vote to indict a ham
201. Id. at 556.
202. Id. at 558.
203. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall. 475 U.S 673. 681 (1986) (recognizing "'pnnciple that the
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence").
see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 109, at 80-88 (discussing increasing use of harmless constitutional
error doctrine).
204. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1985)
205. See id. at 263.
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sandwich.2° Justice Marshall's depiction of the grand jury as a body
exercising independent will over the charging decision is, at very best, an
anachronism, and at worst, pure makeweight.
The Hillery opinion speaks volumes about the Court's redefinition of the
remedy of appellate reversal. Justice Marshall labored mightily to produce a
reason why grand jury discrimination might affect the accuracy of a subsequent
conviction, but the strain is obvious. In fact, it is not even clear that Justice
Marshall attracted five votes to the position that grand jury discrimination is
automatically reversible in every case: Justice O'Connor concurred only in the
judgment in Hillery,"7 and Justice White pointedly declined to join the key
paragraph of Justice Marshall's opinion that established the rule of per se
reversal.2 °8
In the end, Hillery may best be understood not as an opinion about harm
to the reliability of verdicts, but as a last gasp from the group of Justices who
opposed the Court's growing fixation on the reliability of verdicts. After all,
the majority camp in Hillery was the dissenting camp in Fulminante, almost
to a person.2° Of the two opinions in Hillery and Mitchell, Mitchell is the
more direct and more honest-and it is plainly foreclosed by the reasoning of
Fulminante. Whatever the conceptual validity of Hillery when it was decided,
it is now a relic from a bygone era.2 t°
The Justices who brought us the Batson rule thus find themselves in a very
odd contradiction. Jury discrimination, they tell us, is corrosive, offensive,
irrational, illegal-yet absolutely harmless in every case. The depth of this
contradiction is a good hint that something is amiss in the Court's response to
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
V. THE CURIOUS HARM OF BATSON ERROR: THE VIEWS OF BATSON'S
OPPONENTS
One might expect that the Justices who have opposed the creation and
extension of the Batson norm would criticize Batson's proponents for this
central contradiction on the nature of the fair trial injury caused by jury
206. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1169, 1175 (1995); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 260, 263 (1995).
207. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 266-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
208. See id. at 264 n.6.
209. Justice Brennan had retired by the time of Fulminante.
210. I mean here that Hillery is conceptually obsolete, not that it is no longer good law. In Fulminante,
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the error in Hillery as one of the few structural errors that still trigger
automatic reversal. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., for Court in part
and dissenting in part). This citation should not, however, be taken as an endorsement of Hillery's
reasoning; the Chief Justice was, after all, a dissenter in Hillery. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 267 (Powell, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At most, the citation simply reflects the Chief Justice's
deference to precedent.
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discrimination. In a limited way, they have: Justice Scalia, in his J.E.B. dissent,
pointed out that if male and female jurors truly are fungible, then striking them
on account of their gender can harm only the jurors themselves, not the
litigants.t 1 Yet Batson's opponents on the Court have mired themselves in
a contradiction or two of their own making. The most obvious of these is the
precise mirror image of the one plaguing Batson's defenders. Batson's
proponents are unable to point to the harm that jury discrimination causes to
the reliability of criminal verdicts, yet they nonetheless speak of it as harmful.
Batson's opponents, on the other hand, might easily point to the harm that jury
discrimination causes to the reliability of criminal verdicts, yet they speak of
it as harmless.
As noted earlier,- - an error is "structural" (and thus per se reversible)
if it is a flaw in the constitution of the trial mechanism, and obviously harms
the reliability of the verdict, even though a reviewing court cannot pinpoint in
the record exactly when the harm occurred. The proponents of the Batson rule
run into difficulty on the second of these criteria; as they have defined the
Batson norm, it is simply impossible to presume any injury to the reliability
of the verdict.
The opponents of the Batson norm have no trouble at all supplying this
second step of the analysis. From the start, they have embraced rather than
rejected the theory of difference: They have acknowledged that it is at least
minimally rational for an attorney to infer something about a prospective
juror's viewpoint from his or her race or gender, and that jurors of different
races and genders are not "fungible. '' t 3 While Batson's proponents are
forced to assert that replacing one juror with another of a different race or the
other gender has no impact on the jury or the quality of its deliberations,
Batson's opponents can comfortably suggest just the opposite. For the purposes
of choosing an appellate remedy, this is crucial: Batson error becomes not just
a defect in the composition of the trial mechanism, but a defect that makes a
difference. Thus it is Batson's critics, not its champions, who would be able
211. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419. 1437 (1994) (Scalia. 1. dis.enting) (joined
by Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J.) ("But if men and women jurors are (as the Court thinks) fungible. then
the only arguable injury from the prosecutor's 'impermissible' use of male sex as the basis for his
peremptories is injury to the stricken juror, not to the defendant.")
212. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text,
213. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J.. dissenting); see also id. at 1432 (O'Connor. J. concurrng)
("We know that like race, gender matters."): id. at 1436 (Scalia. J. dissenting) (expressing "*prsonall]-
belief that a juror's gender has some statistically significant predictive value in certain types of cases).
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas. J.. concurmng in judgment) (noting "common
experience and common sense" suggest link between juror race and inal outcome in at least some cases).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121 (1986) (Burger, C.J.. dissenting) (endorsing vie, that "certain classes
of people" have statistically demonstrable "predispositions"): id at 138-39 (Rehnquist. J. dissenting)
(accepting group affiliation as "'proxy' for potential juror partiality")
Justice O'Connor, of course, is not technically an opponent of Batson or its extension to at least
certain other contexts. See supra note 75. She does. however, share with Batson's opponents the stew that
a prospective juror's race or gender is a rational predictor of his or her perspective See J EB. 114 S Ct
at 1431-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to define Batson violations as true "structural error," and who might therefore
be expected to favor a rule of automatic reversal.
To compound the contradiction, it appears that Batson's critics would not
in fact favor such a rule. Their view of whether jury discrimination would be
harmless error is difficult to tease out of the cases; their ultimate position, after
all, is that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is not any sort of
error. They have always maintained that when peremptory strikes exercised on
the basis of race or gender fall upon all races and both genders equally, they
do not violate anyone's equal protection rights." 4 They have also maintained
that such strikes, when exercised adversarially by both parties, are useful tools
for eliminating the extremes of bias from both ideological ends of the jury,
thereby enhancing the Sixth Amendment value of jury impartiality.215 Yet at
rare moments, in order to decide cases, they must (or, for the sake of
argument, do) assume that peremptories based on race or gender violate the
Constitution. And they profess to see no harm.
The position that race- or gender-based peremptories do not amount to
reversible error began to emerge just two months after Batson was decided. In
Allen v. Hardy,16 the Court was called upon to decide whether its newly
minted Batson rule should be applied retroactively to cases that had become
final before Batson was decided. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court held
that it should not.2t7 It is impossible to know who wrote the Allen opinion,
but it is certain that the two Batson dissenters, then-Justice Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger, were among the six Justices in the Allen majority."'
That majority could say nothing more of Batson's rule than that it "may have
some bearing on ... truthfinding. ' '21 9 But the majority "[could not] say that
the . . . rule has such a fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as
to compel retroactive application. ' 220 With the ink barely dry on their Batson
dissents--dissents in which both Justices embraced the theory of
difference221-Batson's two opponents on the Court assumed that Batson
214. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423-24
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Batson, 476 U.S. at 137-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
215. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that peremptories can sometimes assure racially diverse jury); Powers, 499 U.S. at 426-27 (Sealia,
J., dissenting) (noting that Holland suggested that race-based peremptories may increase fairness); Holland
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481, 483-84 (1990); Batson, 476 U.S. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
217. See id. at 259-61.
218. Justices Marshall and Stevens, both in the majority in Batson, dissented in Allen. See id. at
261-64. Justice Blackmun, also a member of the Batson majority, objected to the summary disposition in
Allen, and would have set the case for oral argument. See id. at 261 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 259.
220. Id.
221. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting statistical
basis underlying use of race as proxy for bias); id. at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
age, race, and occupation as "'proxy' for potential juror partiality" can be useful for eliminating biased
jurors).
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error was indeed error, yet saw no significant harm to the reliability of
verdicts.222
The position emerged in sharper relief a few years later in Teague v.
Lane,223 a habeas corpus case. In Teague, the petitioner was a black man
who had been convicted of a number of violent crimes by an all-white jury in
state court.224 The trial prosecutor had used all ten of his peremptory
challenges against black prospective jurors.2 Because his conviction had
become final two and a half years before Batson was decided, the defendant
was unable to avail himself of its benefit in his habeas petition. -' Instead,
he urged the Supreme Court to create (and apply to his case) a new Batson-
like rule to enforce the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury that
represents the community.2 27 This was, of course, precisely the Sixth
Amendment argument that a bare majority of the Court would reject on its
merits a year later in Holland v. Illinois.
2 1
The Teague plurality2 9 did not reach the merits of the petitioner's Sixth
Amendment argument. Instead, it held that because the petitioner's Sixth
Amendment argument, if adopted, would "break[] new ground," it was not
appropriate for the Court to announce such a rule in a habeas case.2 '" The
plurality did note that there were certain narrow exceptions to the principle
against announcing new rules of constitutional law in habeas cases. One such
exception applies when the new rule that the habeas petitioner seeks is one
"without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished. 231' But the plurality simply did not see the petitioner's proposed
Sixth Amendment rule as falling into that category. The plurality assumed, for
the sake of argument, that the Sixth Amendment did in fact require a Batson-
like rule to insure that the seated petit jury did not purposely misrepresent the
community, but was nonetheless quite confident that a court's failure to follow
such a rule would not "seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an
accurate conviction. 232 As in Allen v. Hardy, a group of Justices including
Batson's most vociferous opponents accepted the Batson rule (or, in Teague,
222. Justice O'Connor was also in the Allen majonty. She. houever. had joined the Court's opinion
in Batson. See Batson, 476 U.S. at I I I (O'Connor. J.. concurrng)
223. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
224. See id. at 292-93.
225. See id. at 293.
226. See id. at 295-96.
227. See id. at 299, 314-15 (plurality opinion). But see id at 340-42 (Brennan. J . dtimsntingi (noting
Teague's Sixth Amendment claim seeks only "procedures that alloy, a fair poisibili for the jur, to rclecti
a cross-section of the community").
228. 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (5-4 decision). For a discussion of the Coun's opinion in Hlolland. see
infra Section VI.B.
229. The Teague plurality consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist. and Justices O'Connor. Stala. and
Kennedy. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.
230. See id. at 301.
231. Id. at 313.
232. Id. at 315.
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one just like it) on its own terms, imagined that the rule had been violated, yet
saw no significant harm.
The Batson opponents' apparent unwillingness to honor their commitment
to the theory of difference surfaced again in Justice Scalia's dissent in
J.E.B.233 There, the State used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to remove
men from the jury, with the result that the jury actually seated to hear the
paternity suit was all female.2M Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented from the Court's decision to extend
the Batson norm to gender discrimination.235 Chiding the majority for its
"fervent defense of the proposition il n'y a pas de difference entre les hommes
et les femmes,"236 he pointed out that a consequence of the majority's
rejection of the theory of difference was to make all jurors "fungible," and
thereby to eliminate any chance that a litigant might suffer harm from Batson
error.237 He continued his thrust: "Not only has petitioner, by implication of
the Court's own reasoning, suffered no harm, but the scientific evidence
presented at trial established petitioner's paternity with 99.92% accuracy.)
2 38
This meant for Justice Scalia that "[i]nsofar as [the defendant] is concerned,
this is a case of harmless error if there ever was one.
239
It is important to recognize that in this passage of the opinion, Justice
Scalia was not arguing his own views of the harms of discriminatory
peremptory challenges. In Justice Scalia's view, it should be unnecessary even
to address the question of whether the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges could ever be harmless error. For him, such challenges are not
"error" of any kind. They are instead legitimate tools that assist in seating an
impartial jury.240 Rather, he was assuming, for the sake of argument, the
J.E.B. majority's premise that Batson error is in fact error, and was trying to
refute it on its own terms. Any Batson error in this case, he claimed, was
necessarily harmless because first, in the majority's view, jurors are fungible,
and second, in any event, the evidence of the defendant's paternity was
overwhelming.
This second move was the revealing one, for it seems precluded by a
commitment to the theory of difference. Justice Scalia does not think that
jurors are fungible. For Justice Scalia, it is an "undeniable reality ... that all
groups tend to have particular sympathies and hostilities., 24 ' He therefore
233. See J.E.B v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
234. See id. at 1422.
235. See id. at 1436-39 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
236. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (Scalia. J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., id. at 1438-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The biases that go along with group
characteristics tend to be biases that the juror himself does not perceive, so that it is no use asking about
them."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423-24 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. Powers, 499 U.S. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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should not be able to assume that Batson error is indeed error, as he does in
this passage from his J.E.B. dissent, and simultaneously point to the weight of
the evidence as proof that such an error is harmless. If it is in fact error for an
attorney to strike a juror from the jury panel on account of race or gender, and
if that juror's race or gender suggests a distinctive perspective, then that error
must be structural.242 Even if the paternity test were one hundred percent
accurate, that would not matter. The conviction should still be reversed. This
should have been apparent to Justice Scalia, in light of the "vive la diff~rence!"
tone of his J.E.B. dissent. Yet Justice Scalia, and the Batson opponents for
whom he wrote, seemed eager to conclude that Batson error--even assuming
that it was in fact error-could nonetheless be harmless to the reliability of the
verdict.243
VI. BUILDING A BETTER BATSON: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE
REPRESENTATIVE JURY
When it comes to identifying the appropriate appellate remedy for Batson
error, there is more than enough contradiction to go around. Yet the ease with
which Batson's opponents might find Batson error to be structural suggests an
easy way for Batson's proponents to resolve the contradiction in their own
views: They could simply abandon their resistance to the theory of difference.
It has never been entirely clear why Batson's proponents have clung so
tenaciously to the view that race and gender are not just illegal but flatly
irrational proxies for viewpoint. They certainly need not maintain this view in
order to condemn race- and gender-based peremptories as illegal; they could
242. Such an error could not conceivably be labelled trial error and then subjected to harmless error
analysis. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). a consittuttonally defective instruction on
reasonable doubt deprived the murder defendant of his right to trial by a "jury- of the sort guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 276-78. Justice Scalia. writing for a unanimous Court. easily brushed aside
the State's claim that the denial of the defendant's ight to a jury that met the St h Amendment's standards
was amenable to harmless error analysis. See id. at 278-81. He did so in the face of strong evidence of the
defendant's guilt. See State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 180-81. 186 (La. 1992) (noting evidence of
defendant's guilt included inculpatory confession from immunized accomplice, eyewitness identifications.
and expert ballistics testimony linking bullets removed from victim's body and from crime scene to gun
found in apartment where defendant had gone after crime), rev'd sub nom. Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U S
275 (1993). Justice Scalia insisted that it was senseless to inquire whether a real "jury" of the kind
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would undoubtedly have convicted the defendant on such evidence.
the point was that the evidence had never been reviewed by such a jury in the first place because of a
faulty reasonable doubt instruction. See Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 279-80 It stands to reason that harmless
error review would be equally inappropriate in other circumstances where a defendant is denied the "jury"
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U S. 79. 86 (1986) (holding that jury
discrimination violates "tt]he very idea of a jury").
243. See Powers. 499 U.S. at 431 (Scalia. J.. joined by Rehnquist. C.J . dissenting) ("Een if I agreed
that the exercise of peremptory strikes constitutes unlawful discrimination . . . I would not understand why
the release of a convicted murderer who has not been harmed by those strikes is an appropriate remedy ").
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 373 n.* (1979) (Rehnquist. J. dissenting) ("The reversal of concededly
fair convictions returned by concededly impartial juries is. to say the least, an irrational means of
vindicating the equal protection rights of those unconstitutionally excluded from jury service,")
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easily maintain that an attorney acts rationally by making these sorts of
challenges, but that values of antidiscrimination in the Constitution make this
rational behavior illegal. This is precisely the position Justice O'Connor took
in her concurring opinion in J.E.B.24 Thus Batson's supporters could
concede that the opposing camp is right, at least in part: Race and gender are
rational, even if imperfect, proxies for viewpoint. This concession would
supply them with the missing piece in their "structural error" analysis, and
would permit them to establish a rule of automatic reversal for Batson
violations.245
Yet the rule of automatic reversal would not be an entirely satisfactory
solution. It would perpetuate the oddity of conscripting the Equal Protection
Clause for the task of regulating the fairness of criminal trials and the accuracy
of jury verdicts, when there are a number of other protections in the Bill of
Rights-the most obvious being the Sixth Amendment's Jury Clause246-that
seem more obviously suited to these ends. The Equal Protection Clause
handles well the participational injury suffered by the wrongfully excluded
jurors and the stigmatic injury suffered by minority jurors and defendants. But
it takes a fairly creative gloss on equal protection to conscript it as a fair trial
guarantee, a gloss that the Court has not supplied.247
There is, however, another solution to the problem of the fair trial harm
caused by Batson error: relocate the fair trial harm from the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to the Sixth Amendment's 248 jury trial
244. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431-32 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 940-42 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
245. Of course, if Batson's proponents were now to embrace the theory of difference, this would place
them at odds with the overall direction in which the Court appears to be heading on the issue of racial
difference. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) ("In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American."); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827
(1993). See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 1995, at 19
(explaining and critiquing several decisions of Supreme Court's 1994 Term that revealed emerging
commitment to absolute colorblindness in constitutional adjudication).
246. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law .... ).
247. The Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to guarantee some minimal fairness in post-trial
proceedings-on appeals and collateral review. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58
(1963) (holding that indigent defendants have right to appointed counsel on first direct appeal taken as of
right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that indigent defendants have right to trial
transcript at public expense where necessary on direct appeal). Even in these cases, the Court did not use
the Equal Protection Clause to gauge the actual fairness of the substance of the appellate or collateral
review. Rather, the Court simply used the Equal Protection Clause to insist on equal access to this sort of
review, regardless of wealth.
248. Others have pointed to the Sixth Amendment as a possible constraint on the discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 79, at 1132-34 (proposing elimination of
all peremptory challenges in order to vindicate Sixth Amendment's requirement of "impartial" jury); Toni
M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64
N.C. L. REv. 501, 541-63 (1986) (proposing elimination of prosecutor's peremptory challenges to produce
jury that satisfies Sixth Amendment's impartiality, community representation, and peer representation
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guarantee.2 49 Yet this solution faces a significant obstacle: the Supreme
Court's 1990 opinion in Holland v. Illinois.50 There a bare majority of the
Court rejected the notion that discriminatory peremptory challenges might harm
the reliability of verdicts; the Court maintained that such challenges enhance
rather than detract from reliability by allowing the litigants to remove
potentially biased jurors from the panel. 5 But two crucial inconsistencies
weaken the Holland majority opinion. First, three of the five Justices in the
Holland majority have embraced the theory of difference in their opinions in
the Batson line of cases. 52 That embrace should lead these Justices to see
that a reliable verdict is, at least in part, a verdict pronounced by a jury that
requirements); Wendy Lynn Trugman, The Representative Jurn Standard. An Alternative to Batson v
Kentucky, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403 (1986) (criticizing intent-based equal protection theory of Batson.
and proposing effects-based theory based on Sixth Amendment's representative cross-section requirement)
249. Nancy King proposes a different solution in her comprehensive article See supra note 79
Canvassing the social science literature on the decisionmaking effects of racial prejudice. King concludes
that it is possible for reviewing courts actually to measure the effects of discrimination in at least some
cases. She seems to argue that reversal should be confined to those cases where social science data strongly
predict that discrimination played a role in the verdict. In a sense. King disputes the Court's instinct that
Batson error is structural; she believes that it is like trial error, in that its precise impact on the verdict can
be measured. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279. 310-11 (1991) (Rehnquist. CJ . for Court in part
and dissenting in part) (explaining difference between trial and structural error).
I have one major objection to King's solution, and the Court would surely have another My hesitation
is that the social science data do not actually permit the sort of fine-tuned measurement that King would
expect of them. King concedes as much. In summarizing the measuring value of the data she has
catalogued, she allows no more than this:
mhe studies would support a finding of a high probability of prejudice from jury discrimination
if a black defendant could establish that he was convicted and sentenced to death for killing a
white police officer by an all-white jury that heard racial epithets during tnal and deliberations.
when the case turned on the defendant's claim of self-defense and evidence of guilt was
close-primarily a swearing match between black defense witnesses and the officer's
partner--and when legal selection procedures would probably have produced a jury % ith at least
three blacks. Conversely, the studies suggest a low probability that a white defendant indicted
for sexually abusing a black child would be prejudiced by discriminatory selection practices that
reduced the number of blacks on the grand jury by one.
King, supra note 79, at 100 n.138. But these cases are far too easy to be illuminating. We do not need to
rely on social science for these results; our own common sense instincts do just fine King's solution is
therefore not really a solution, because the rule would not help courts decide hard cases
The Court would undoubtedly have an even more basic objection to King's solution King hinges her
entire claim that the effects of race prejudice are measurable on social science data. This is. of course, her
only choice, asjury deliberations are secret, and testimony about those deliberations generally inadmissible
See FED. R. EviD. 606(b). But the Court has grown extremely hostile to the notion of building rules.
especially equal protection rules, on social science data. See McClskey v. Kemp. 481 U S_ 279 (1987)
(refusing to rely on extensive empirical study of capital punishment in Georgia); see also Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,246 (1978) (Powell, J.. concurring in the judgment) (questioning Justice Blackmun's
"heavy reliance on numerology derived from statistical studies" to establish that five-member juries violate
Sixth Amendment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190. 204 (1976) ("It is unrealistic to expect either members
of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique But
this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological proposittons by statistics is a dubious business, and
one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause ")
King offers no reason why the Court would be more inclined to base a rule on social science data in this
area than in any other.
250. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
251. See id. at 484.
252. These are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. See infra text accompanying
notes 285-86.
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represents distinctive groups in the community. Second, the Holland majority's
position is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's Jury Clause, which
demands a jury that strikes an acceptable balance between the sometimes
conflicting demands of impartiality and community representation. I now turn
to these two important inconsistencies.
A. The Theory of Difference and the Subversion of the Scientistic Verdict
Two lines of Supreme Court cases are the focus of this Article: one
expanding the Batson norm and the other expanding harmless error doctrine.
In these two lines of cases, two discrete camps of Justices have been working
at cross-purposes. The Justices who have pushed the hardest to prioritize
verdict reliability as the preeminent value in the criminal process have also
been the loudest opponents of the Batson norm;253 and the proponents of the
Batson norm have been the Justices who have resisted the Court's sole focus
on verdict reliability2
54
I have already noted how neither camp has been able to devise an
internally consistent account of the fair trial harm that Batson error causes. Yet
253. This camp of Justices currently consists of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas. Of this group, only Chief Justice Rehnquist was on the Court when Batson was decided. However,
Justices Scalia and Thomas have repeatedly expressed the view that Batson was a mistake. See Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 69-70 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to gradual destruction of
defendants' rights to peremptory challenges); id. at 60 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("I write
separately to express my general dissatisfaction with our continuing attempts to use the Constitution to
regulate peremptory challenges."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,431 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Even
if I agreed that the exercise of peremptory strikes constitutes unlawful discrimination (which I do
not) .... ); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1439 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing against extension of Batson to sex).
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Fulminante that expanded harmless error doctrine to
coerced confessions, and was joined by (among others) Justice Scalia. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 281.
Justice Thomas was not on the Court at the time of Fulminante, and he has not yet had the opportunity to
indicate that he shares the Court's focus on verdict reliability as the central value in the criminal process.
As Justice Thomas seems to share Justice Scalia's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting patterns,
particularly in criminal cases, it seems fair to assume that he shares this particular viewpoint as well. See
Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia
and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593 (1995); Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior.
1994 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 269, 289 (1995) (noting comparable voting patterns among
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas in criminal cases); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REV. 10,
341 (1995) (showing that in 1994 Term, Thomas voted with Scalia 88.2% of time and with Rehnquist
81.4% of time); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26, 373 (showing that in 1993 Term,
Thomas voted with Scalia 82.8% of time and with Rehnquist 67.8% of time); The Supreme Court, 1992
Term, 107 HARV. L. REV. 27, 373 (1993) (showing that in 1992 Term, Thomas voted with Scalia 86% of
time and with Rehnquist 82.5% of time); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REV. 19, 379
(1992) (showing that in 1991 Term, Thomas voted with Scalia 85.9% of time and with Rehnquist 80% of
time).
254. There is nearly a one-to-one correspondence between majority votes in Batson and dissenting
votes in Fulminante. The Batson majority included Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens (in
addition to Justices Brennan and Powell); these four were the four dissenters in Fulhniante on the question
of whether harmless error analysis should apply to coerced confessions. Notably, their position in
Fulninante was not just that coerced confessions impugn the reliability of verdicts, but also that coerced
confessions should trigger automatic reversal because they offend other important values. See Fulninante,
499 U.S. at 293 (White, J., for Court in part and dissenting in part).
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there is a more fundamental inconsistency in the position of the Batson
opponents, an inconsistency with grave ramifications for the enterprise of
protecting the reliability of criminal verdicts.
The problem for the Batson opponents begins with their ready embrace of
the theory of difference. By asserting that it is rational for an attorney to
attribute a particular viewpoint to a prospective juror on account of his or her
race or gender and to strike the juror on the basis of that rational inference, the
Batson opponents commit themselves to a very basic-and, indeed, somewhat
radical-proposition about the nature of the criminal verdict. This proposition
is that verdicts are influenced and even determined not just by the evidence in
the case, but also by the racial and gender composition of the jury itself. If it
is rational for an attorney to infer that, say, a Latino juror will bring certain
views into the jury room, and to try to remove that juror on the strength of that
inference, it must also be rational to conclude that that juror's views could help
determine the verdict. What is this but to admit that two lawfully constituted
juries2" of differing racial and gender composition could view the same
evidence yet reach different conclusions"-' on the ultimate question of guilt
or innocence?2 7 Is this not what the verdicts in the two so-called "Rodney
King" cases suggested? In these two prosecutions, two different lawfully
composed juries reviewed similar evidence on similar charges and reached
different verdicts. This is certainly not an airtight demonstration that race and
gender shape criminal verdicts; the charges and evidence in the prosecutions
were not identical, and, perhaps more importantly, the riots that took place
between the two trials may have influenced jurors. Still, there was virtual
consensus that the ethnicity of the two juries helped shape their verdicts. 5
255. By two "lawfully constituted juries." I mean two junes from which all jurors subject to challenge
for cause have been removed.
256. Reviewing social science research. Mark Cammack recently concluded that "to conscientious
jurors exposed to the same evidence may develop reconstructions of the facts and implications of those
facts that are 'surprisingly dissimilar."' Cammack. supra note 29. at 476 (quoting William C Thompson
et al., Death Penalty Attitudes & Conviction Proneness. 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 95. 110-11 (1984)) As
Cammack noted, this does not necessarily translate into different verdicts: "'[D~lcrsf)rng the jury's
standards for describing the social world may ennch the facifinding process generally without
systematically orienting it toward conviction or acquittal." Id. at 479. Still. Cammack agreed that "there
is a demonstrated correlation between race and decision in at least some cases." Id. (citing Johnson. supra
note 79, at 1625-43; King, supra note 79, at 80-91); see also Brown. supra note 27. at 117 (noting that
race and gender influence jury voting). But see Jeffrey E. Pfeifer. Comment. Rnvteisng the Empirical
Evidence on Jury Racism: Findings of Discrimination or Discrimnatory Findings 7. 69 NEu L REv 230.
241-50 (1990) (questioning validity of social science research in this area).
257. It is no response to say, as Batson's opponents do. that the value of the unfettered peremptory
is that it allows the parties to work against precisely this outcome b) cleansing the jur) of bias and thereby
enhancing impartiality. Not only is such a goal unattainable in practice, as the law nosherc allocates to a
party an unlimited number of peremptory challenges, but it is also undesirable in theory The Sixth
Amendment does not command singleminded pursuit of an impartial jury. it requires a balance of. or
compromise between, the sometimes conflicting norms of impartalit) and community representation See
infra text accompanying notes 302-05.
258. See generally Colloquy, Racism in the Wake of the Los Angeles Riots, 70 DE.%v U L RE' 187
(1993) (addressing systematic nature of racism in wake of Los Angeles unrest). S)mposium. Los Angeles,
April 29, 1992 and Beyond: The Low Issues. and Perspectnes' 66 S CAL L RE' 1313 (1993)
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This, then, is the consequence of the Batson opponents' embrace of the
theory of difference: a corresponding embrace of the view that verdicts are, at
least in part, socially rather than scientifically determined.25 9 I have
characterized this as a "somewhat radical" view of the criminal verdict because
it diverges so sharply from the conception of the criminal verdict that the
Batson opponents express in the harmless error cases. 60 In those cases, the
jury is a factfinder applying mechanical tests to discrete bits of empirical
evidence, and the verdict is the certifiably reliable statement of historical truth
that results from that testing. In their Batson opinions, however, the Batson
opponents effectively concede that verdicts are not just findings of empirical,
historical fact, but are at least in part the products of racially, sexually, or
otherwise experientially influenced perspectives. 6'
The recognition that criminal verdicts are experientially constructed
judgments rather than findings of immutable historical fact could lead to two
possible conclusions about harmless error doctrine. One of these-the more
extreme of the two-is that the entire institution of harmless error review is
built on a lie. The harmless error enterprise is, after all, designed to protect the
reliability of the criminal verdict. If verdicts are simply incapable of being
"reliable" in any ordinary sense of that term, because they are the products of
life experience, subjective viewpoint, and value judgment, then the idea of
reserving appellate reversal for errors that threaten the value of reliability is
rather dishonest.262
However, it does not follow from the Batson opponents' embrace of the
theory of difference that juries engage in nothing that we would recognize as
"fact-finding," or that verdicts are solely the product of subjective judgment.
(addressing legal, political, and cultural circumstances that precipitated unrest in Los Angeles following first
Rodney King verdict).
259. Here Batson's opponents reject the empiricism of Batson's proponents and reveal strong
contextualist leanings. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
260. The view does not strike me as particularly radical in the abstract. Admittedly, it would be radical
if juries were required to reply to special interrogatories on discrete factual questions in criminal cases,
rather than to announce a general verdict on the overall question of guilt or innocence. If this were our
system's practice, jury verdicts would look a lot more like the findings of historical fact that the Court
seems to imagine in its harmless error cases. But as a rule, juries in this country issue general verdicts on
the question of guilt or innocence. This is a more ambiguous determination-one which does not fit as
comfortably into a model of historical fact. For a discussion of the prevailing preference for general verdicts
in criminal cases, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 912-13 (1994); Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal
Cases: Constitutional Limits on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 Mo. L. REV. I, 49
n.179 (1993); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1377, 1398, 1420-23 (1994); Eric S. Miller, Note, Compound-Complex Criminal Statutes and the
Constitution: Demanding Unanimity as to Predicate Acts, 104 YALE L.J. 2277, 2304 (1995).
261. Stated a bit differently, it cannot simultaneously be true that a jury's sole function is reliably to
uncover a preexisting empirical fact, and that the racially or sexually influenced perspectives that jurors
bring to the jury room actually have an impact on the verdict. Yet this is exactly what the opinions of the
Batson opponents say, when read together with their opinions in the harmless error cases.
262. For a similar view in the far broader context of epistemology (rather than the narrow context of
harmless error review), see Cammack. supra note 29. at 420.
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Simple common sense tells us that some kinds of errors are more likely than
others to mislead or inflame all juries, regardless of their composition. The
insight of the Batson dissenters into the nature of the criminal verdict does not
require the complete abandonment of the harmless error enterprise, 63 merely
an adjustment to it. For even though this insight does not subvert the entire
structure of harmless error doctrine, it does show that the scientistic model of
"reliability" on which the doctrine currently rests is stunted. In a world where
it is rational to attribute distinctive perspectives to discrete groups within the
community, a "reliable" verdict is not a verdict pronounced by a jury that has
seen the strength of those perspectives diminished through peremptory
challenges. 26 Such a verdict will not reliably reflect the consensus of the
community, and the entire community will not accept such a verdict as a
reliable judgment. 65 This, then, is the second, more sensible conclusion that
should flow from the Batson opponents' commitment to the theory of
difference: a reliable verdict becomes the consensus of a jury whose
membership incorporates those distinctive perspectives. 2'
This is admittedly an incomplete definition of a reliable verdict.
Representation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of reliability. To
produce a "reliable" verdict, a trial must not only be judged by a jury that
represents the discrete perspectives of the community, but it must also be free
of the traditional reliability-impairing errors that the Court has identified in its
harmless error cases. The important point here is that the reliability of a verdict
is inseparable from the representativeness of the jury. The image of the jury
as a scientific laboratory is fatally incomplete; in order to fulfill its central
mission of producing reliable verdicts, a criminal jury must incorporate and
represent the distinctive views of the community.
B. The Representative Jur,: Batson's Opponents Take a Wrong Turn in
Holland
Unlike the first of the two possible conclusions from the Batson
opponents' endorsement of the theory of difference, the conclusion that
reliability depends, in part, on community representation is not radical at all.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the "jury" guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment must be constituted in a way that allows it to speak with the
voice of the community. In its cases on jury size, for example, the Court has
held that a jurisdiction may shrink its juries from the traditional twelve to as
few as six members because this reduction does not excessively imperil the
263. Again, Mark Cammack has made a similar point in the broader context of theones of knowledge
See id. at 421.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 302-05
265. See supra note 85.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 302-05: see also Marder. supra note 79. at 1066-74
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"possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.t9 67
Five-member juries, however, are not the "juries" guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, because the drop below six "prevents juries from truly
representing their communities. ' 268 The Court has said the same thing in its
cases on jury unanimity. It has approved verdicts reached by ten out of twelve
jurors2 69 because such verdicts do not excessively endanger any crucial value
in the Sixth Amendment, including representation of the community.27 But
it has condemned verdicts reached by five out of six as too grave a threat to
those values.27' Thus the notion that the "jury" defined by the Sixth
Amendment must be a body that represents the community is hardly novel.
Yet this is precisely where the opponents of Batson tumble into their
deepest inconsistency. In 1990, the case of Holland v. Illinois 72 presented
these Justices with the opportunity to make good on the commitment to the
theory of difference that they had shown, and would continue to show, in their
opinions in the Batson line of cases. The defendant argued in Holland that a
jury selected through the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
was not the "jury" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.2 73 In effect, the
defendant asked the Court to find that race discrimination in the selection of
petit juries violated not just equal protection values, as Batson had established,
but a Sixth Amendment value as well. The claimed Sixth Amendment value
267. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
268. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (Blackmun, J.). There is some confusion as to
whether Justice Blackmun's opinion in Ballew is for the Court, or whether only Justice Stevens joined it.
While not a foolproof summary of the opinion, the Syllabus prepared by the Reporter's Office suggests that
only Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's opinion. See id. at 223. This is technically true: Only Justice
Stevens agreed with Justice Blackmun's views both that the five-person jury violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments and that the appropriate remedy was a new trial. Yet in a separate one-paragraph
opinion, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, Justice Brennan stated that he "join[ed] Mr. Justice
Blackmun's opinion insofar as it holds that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require juries in criminal
trials to contain more than five persons." Id. at 246 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added). This group of three
Justices did not think a new trial was the appropriate remedy for unrelated reasons, but quite clearly did
join Justice Blackmun's opinion-not just the judgment-on the Sixth Amendment issue. Contrary to the
suggestion in the syllabus of the decision, it seems that Justice Blackmun's Sixth Amendment analysis did
attract five votes. In addition, Justice White explicitly agreed that a five-person jury violated the Sixth
Amendment because "a jury of fewer than six persons would fail to represent the sense of the
community .... Id. at 245 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
269. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion). The Court also upheld a
verdict reached by nine out of twelve jurors against a due process and equal protection challenge in
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362-65 (1972).
270. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410-11.
271. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134-39 (1979). The Court in Burch was very clear that
the five-sixths voting rule was unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because it
"sufficiently threaten[ed] the constitutional principles that led to the establishment of the size threshold"
of six that the Court had established in Ballew. Id. at 139. Those principles, of course, included the
principle that a jury must represent the community. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
272. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
273. See id. at 477-78. The defendant, a white man objecting to the exclusion of black jurors, also
had to argue that he had standing to raise the Sixth Amendment claim. The Court agreed that he did. See
id. at 476-77.
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was, of course, exactly the one that the Court had identified in its jury size and
jury unanimity cases-jury representativeness. 4
Voting five to four, the Court-in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,
perhaps the most vocal of Batson's opponents-rejected the defendant's
claim. 275 The Court gave two reasons for its decision, one doctrinal and the
other practical. First, the Court interpreted its cases to establish the proposition
that "representativeness" is constitutionally required only of the venire from
which petit juries are chosen.2 76 There is no constitutional value of
representation at the level of the petit jury actually seated, the Court reasoned;
a state might have (and act upon) any legitimate reason for "disrupt[ing]" the
representativeness of the venire in seating its juries.2"n Second, the Court
held that any other conclusion was impractical and, therefore, unthinkable.
Repeating its oft-stated views that "'[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of
any particular composition' ' 278 and that petit juries need not precisely
"'reflect the composition of the community at large,'-2" the Court saw no
stopping point to the defendant's argument. 2 If the Sixth Amendment
required representativeness at the stage of the petit jury (as opposed to the
venire), then "intentionally using peremptory challenges to exclude any
identifiable group should be impermissible."2"' Such a rule, the Court
worried, would either make it impossible ever to seat a jury in any case, or,
what was more likely, destroy the ancient institution of the peremptory
challenge. 82
The Court's decision in Holland is hard to fathom. At a purely doctrinal
level, the Court's holding that the Sixth Amendment has nothing to say about
the representativeness of seated juries is rank revisionism of earlier Sixth
Amendment cases. One need look no further than the cases on jury size and
jury unanimitya 3 to see that community representation is a Sixth Amendment
value at the level of the seated petit jury. What separated the six-member jury
in Williams from the five-member jury in Ballew, and the ten-out-of-twelve
274. See id. at 478.
275. See id. at 477-88. Joining Justice Scalia in the Holland majority were Chief Justice Rchnquist
and Justices White. O'Connor, and Kennedy. Justices Brennan. Marshall. Blackmun. and Stccns dissented.
All of the Holland dissenters were in the Batson majority, as were Justices White and O'Connor See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79. 81 (1986).
276. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 482-83 (citing Lockhart v McCree. 476 U S 162. 173-75 (1986))
277. See id. at 483. The legitimate state interest that the Court saw in Holland for skewing the
representative nature of the jury was "the assurance of impartiality that the system of peremptory challenges
has traditionally provided." Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 302-05
278. Holland, 493 U.S. at 483 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana. 419 U S 522. 538 (1975))
279. Id. (quoting Lockhart v. McCree. 476 U.S. 162. 173 (1986)).
280. See id. at 484-86; see also id. at 488 (Kennedy. J.. concumng) (arguing defendant's contention
"admits of no limiting principle to make it workable in practice")
281. Id. at 484.
282. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419. 1439 (1994) (Scalia. J. dissenting)
(describing peremptory challenge as "a practice that has been considered an essential par of fair jury trial
since the dawn of the common law").
283. See supra notes 267-71.
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voting rule in Apodaca from the five-out-of-six rule in Burch, was the Sixth
Amendment value of community representation: The Williams and Apodaca
regimes satisfied it; the Ballew and Burch regimes did not. Georgia surely had
minimally "legitimate" reasons to seat juries of five, and Louisiana to accept
verdicts from five-if none other than speed, convenience, and expense. Yet
the Court never suggested that the Sixth Amendment value of community
representation could be overcome by such reasons. The Holland Court's refusal
to recognize that the Sixth Amendment's protection of jury representation
extends beyond the venire to the petit jury itself is untrue to the Court's own
Sixth Amendment cases.284
Moreover, by refusing to acknowledge a Sixth Amendment value of
community representation at the level of the petit jury, three of the five
Justices in the Holland majority are untrue to their own embrace of the theory
of difference in their opinions in the Batson line of cases.285 By virtue of that
embrace, these three Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
O'Connor, commit themselves to the idea that in the context of jury
deliberations, race and gender "matter[]"286 -to the deliberations, to the
outcomes of those deliberations, and to public acceptance of those outcomes.
As explained above, this analytic move should commit these Justices to a
particular vision of the criminal verdict, and indeed, of the criminal jury
itself-a vision that insists on full representation of the community as a
condition of reliable verdicts.287 Yet exactly this broad vision is lacking in
Holland. There, these same Justices tell us that the Sixth Amendment is not
even concerned with representation. This very deep and basic contradiction
suggests that these Justices simply failed to face the consequences of their
views. To be true to Sixth Amendment precedent, and to their own insights
284. In his opinion for the Court in Holland, Justice Scalia seemed at times to pretend that the jury
size and jury unanimity cases never happened. For example, Justice Scalia asserted that "[tihe Sixth
Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative
jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does)." Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990). If the Sixth Amendment does not assure a representative jury, then what could
possibly support the Court's holdings in Williams, Ballew, Apodaca, and Burch? What would stand in the
way of a jury of five? Or less than five? Or a verdict by simple majority of a three-person jury?
At other times, Justice Scalia acknowledged that these precedents were on the books, but read them
as isolated decisions devoid of any meaning beyond their facts. "While statements in our prior cases have
alluded to ... a 'fair possibility' requirement," he wrote, "satisfying it has not been held to require
anything beyond the inclusion of all cognizable groups in the venire, see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986); Duren [v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)]; Taylor [v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)], and
the use of a jury numbering at least six persons, see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)." Holland, 493 U.S. at 478. This is not reasoning; this is list making. What
Justice Scalia omitted, besides the jury unanimity cases, was the reason that the Sixth Amendment
condemns five-person juries or nonunanimous verdicts from six-person juries, the underlying idea that links
Lockhart, Duren, and Taylor with Ballew and Williams (and, for that matter, Apodaca and Burch as well).
That underlying constitutional idea is the Sixth Amendment's insistence that ajury represent the community
from which it is drawn.
285. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
286. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
287. See supra Section VI.A.
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about the nature of the criminal verdict and the criminal jury, the Holland
majority should have acknowledged that community representation is a
constitutional requirement, even at the level of the seated petit jury.2"
Of course, to read Justice Scalia's opinion in Holland, the Justices in the
majority had the best of reasons to rule as they did. The Court has long, and
wisely, resisted any suggestion that juries must be exact mirrors of the
communities from which they are drawn. 2"9 Even in the most strictly
homogeneous of places, a single jury cannot possibly replicate the exact racial,
ethnic, and gender mix of the community from which it is drawn, let alone the
mix of religions, professions, hobbies, and other interests that might break the
community into "identifiable groups." The hope that all juries might do so is
just that-a vain and impractical hope. This vain hope is what the Holland
majority imagined to be the logical conclusion of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment argument.290 Thus the Justices in the Holland majority were
undoubtedly right to fear the result that they imagined.
Yet they were wrong to imagine only the result that they feared.29 ' The
defendant in Holland was not asking the Court to require mirror-image
representation. The defendant simply was asking the Court to apply the Batson
rule.292 This is an important difference: It is the difference between an
288. Akhil Reed Amar has argued powerfully that the criminal jury was designed as a rcprcsentattie
democratic body-in his words, "a political institution embodying popular sovereignty and republican self-
government." Amar, supra note 85, at 684. Juries. according to Amar. are "supposed to represent the
polity--the people," even if such representation might "trump a given defendant's desires " Id at 685
Amar praises the Court for adopting and extending the Batson norm; he sees the Batson line of cases
as implementing the Constitution's commitment to a representatisve jury. See td at 685 1 agree with Amar
that the results of the Batson line of cases help achieve a more representative jury Yet I am puzzled by
Amar's assertion that the Court here "has been on just the right track " Id If the notion that a criminal jury
must represent the community is, as the title of his article implies, a "Sixth Amendment first principle."
then the Court ought not be praised for sneaking a Sixth Amendment first principle into the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, It should instead be criticized for failing, as it did in
Holland, to enforce a Sixth Amendment first principle under the Sixth Amendment
289. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986); Duren v Missoun. 439 U S 357. 364
n.20 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522. 538 (1975).
290. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1990)
291. Other models for the claimed Sixth Amendment right were readily asailable to the Holland
majority, especially two well-known state decisions that interpreted state constitutional jury trial guarantees
in much the way Holland proposed for the Sixth Amendment. See People v, Wheeler. 583 P2d 748 (Cal
1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979) For a thorough discus-,ston of these cases.
see William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 SLi CT REv
97, 103-06.
292. Holland's attorney's strategic decision to litigate under the Sixth Amendment rather than the
Equal Protection Clause might seem odd: If Batson already provided the necessary rule. %%hy look for one
in the Sixth Amendment as well? The simple answer is that the defendant in Holland was white. and the
Supreme Court had not yet decided Powers. which permitted defendants not of the same race as excluded
jurors to avail themselves of the Batson rule. See Powers v Ohio. 499 U S 400. 404 (1991) Holland's
attorney most likely thought that he had a better chance of establishing standing under the Sixth
Amendment than under the Equal Protection Clause. See The Suprene Court 1989 Terni-Leading Cases.
104 HARV. L. REv. 129, 169 n.10 (1990).
As things turned out, this was a bad strategy. Shortly after Holland lost his Sixth Amendment
argument, another white defendant persuaded the Court to adopt the equal protection analysis that Holland's
attorney had avoided. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 404 (1991) But it was an enormoul) telling strategy.
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affirmative and a negative formulation of the Sixth Amendment's requirement
of community representation. In its earlier cases on the representation
requirement, the Court defined the requirement negatively: To seat juries that
are sufficiently representative of the community to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment, a jurisdiction may use twelve jurors, or it may use six, or it may
(presumably) use sixty. But it may not use fewer than six.293 Thus,
representation does not affirmatively require any particular number of jurors
above six, but it does forbid juries of fewer than six.
The Holland Court pretended that the only way to implement the Sixth
Amendment's requirement of community representation was with an
affirmative rule: To be representative, a jury must look exactly like the
community. However, the Court could just as easily implement the norm of
representation with a negative rule: A jury is sufficiently representative of the
community to satisfy the Sixth Amendment when it is chosen from a
representative venire without a violation of the Batson rule.294 It is all a
revealing the gaping fair trial hole at the center of Batson. Holland's attorney faced a problem of standing:
How could a white defendant have standing to lodge a Batson objection to the exclusion of black jurors?
The law of standing would require Holland to show that he had suffered a "concrete injury" from the
exclusion of black jurors. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 n.3 (1992). Holland's
attorney undoubtedly read Batson and saw no way to articulate any real equal-protection-based harm that
a white defendant could possibly suffer from the exclusion of black jurors. This was certainly not an
unreasonable reading of Batson. See supra Part IV. The Sixth Amendment, with its insistence on
community representation, undoubtedly seemed a far safer choice. It was-at least on the issue of standing.
The Holland Court had little trouble in concluding that a white defendant had standing to contest the
exclusion of black jurors under the Sixth Amendment. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 474. Holland's lawyer's
sensible choice to litigate under the Sixth Amendment says much about the curious lack of a fair trial injury
at the core of Batson.
293. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
294. On direct appeal, a claim of Batson error can reach an appellate court in two main ways.
Commonly, a defendant claims that the trial court wrongly determined that the prosecutor did not violate
Batson in challenging a juror. Here, the defendant is asking the appellate court to conclude that the
prosecutor removed a juror on account of race or gender and in fact had no race- or gender-neutral grounds
to doubt the juror's impartiality.
Less commonly, a defendant argues that the trial court wrongly found that defense counsel violated
Batson in challenging a juror. Here, the defendant is asking the appellate court to conclude that defense
counsel did in fact have race- or gender-neutral grounds to doubt the juror's impartiality, but that the trial
court wrongly saw the peremptory as race- or gender-based. Only in the first of these two scenarios should
the court find a structural Sixth Amendment error of the kind that I have described in this Article. This
might seem odd at first. Both of these situations arguably present claims of Batson error, yet I am
suggesting that only the former presents a Sixth Amendment structural error warranting automatic reversal.
This is so because the latter claim is really not a claim of Batson error at all; it is simply a claim that the
trial court wrongly stripped the defense of a statutorily conferred peremptory challenge.
A recent Ninth Circuit case shows why this is true. United States v. Annigoni, 57 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
1995), concerned a bank fraud prosecution involving a real estate partnership. On voir dire, an Asian
prospective juror named Jue Horn admitted that he had an investment in a real estate partnership and
suggested that he knew of litigation over the investment. See id. at 741. Defense counsel exercised a
peremptory challenge against Horn. See id. In response to the prosecutor's Batson objection, defense
counsel explained that he was challenging Horn because of his investment background, not his race. See
id. at 742. The district court found that defense counsel's peremptory was race-based and left Horn on the
jury. See id. The jury convicted Annigoni. See id. at 741.
To prevail on appeal, the defendant needed to convince the appellate court that defense counsel had
not violated Batson by challenging Horn but in fact had a convincing race-neutral explanation for doubting
his impartiality and wanting him off the jury. The injury that the defendant claimed he suffered was not
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question of where the Court sets the threshold for representation. The Court in
Holland set the threshold impractically high, and then condemned the rule as
impractical. The Batson rule presented the Holland Court with a lower, and
more workable, threshold, much like the one the Court adopted in its jury size
and jury unanimity cases.295 The Court was wrong to reject this more
practical negative definition of the Sixth Amendment's requirement of
community representation.
29
What frightened the Holland majority was, of course, not just the notion
that the Sixth Amendment might require juries to be exact racial mirrors of the
community. The majority was also convinced that juries would have to mirror
the community in every way, that attorneys would be forbidden from striking
"not Oust] blacks, but postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen, or any number of
other identifiable groups. '297 The Court here was pointing out a difference
between the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth Amendment: For all of its
flaws as a fair trial guarantee, 291 the Equal Protection Clause at least provides
a coherent basis for limiting the Batson rule to discrimination against
minorities and women. The Holland majority evidently saw no way to impose
a similar limit on a Sixth Amendment rule.
Yet surely there are stopping points on the road to full and proportional
representation of all "identifiable groups" such as "postmen, or lawyers, or
harm to the representativeness of the jury, but harm to the impartiality of the jury A white-collar ease
about real estate partnerships ended up being judged by a jury that included a possibly defrauded investor
in real estate partnerships. At bottom, this was simply a claim that the district court mistakenly disallowed
the defendant a peremptory challenge that he should have had as a matter of statutory nght See 28 U S C
§ 1870 (1994).
The question on an appeal such as this is not how to remedy a Batson violation, because to reach the
question of remedy, the appellate court must first find that there was no Batson violation and consequently
no harm to the Sixth Amendment value of community representation. The question on this appeal is rather
how the court should remedy the improper denial of a party's statutory right to a peremptory challenge
The Annigoni court held that automatic reversal was not the appropriate remedy and affirmed the
conviction. Annigoni, 57 F.3d at 745. The Third and Fifth Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion.
opting for a rule of per se reversal. See Kirk v. Raymark Indus., 61 F3d 147. 162 (3d Cir 1995). United
States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1993). While this question is beyond the scope of this
Article, the Annigoni court's approach appears far more consistent with the Supreme Court's clear hostility
to rules of automatic reversal for errors that do not plainly undermine the reliability of the jury's verdict-
See supra Part III.
295. Indeed, this distinction between affirmative and negative rules of representation is one that the
Court has drawn in its jury discrimination cases. See. e.g.. Carter v Jury Comm'n, 396 U S 320. 343
(1970) (Douglas. J., dissenting in part) ("Wre have often said that no jury need represent proportionally a
cross-section of the community .... Jury selection is largely by chance. and no matter what the race of
the defendant, he bears the risk that no racial component, presumably favorable to him. will appear on the
jury that tries him. The law only requires that the panel not be purposely unrepresentative "). Thiel v
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("(American tradition of trial by juryl does not mean that
every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and
geographical groups of the community .... But at does mean that prospecaive jurors shall be selected by
court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups ")
296. See Raymond J. Broderick. Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished. 65 TEMP L
REv. 369, 408-10 (1992) (criticizing Holland for tolerating systematic exclusion of identifiable community
groups through peremptory challenges).
297. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486 (1990).
298. See supra note 247.
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clergymen. '29 9 As explained above,3 ° the Sixth Amendment requires
community representation on the petit jury not just for its educative or political
value,30' but also because representation contributes crucially to the reliability
of criminal verdicts. As most of the Justices in the Holland majority suggest
in their opinions in the Batson line of cases, criminal verdicts are not just
findings of historical fact, but expressions of an inescapably subjective
consensus reached among jurors who bring discrete viewpoints and
perspectives to their deliberations. Representation of these discrete viewpoints
on the jury enhances the reliability of the criminal verdict, both by
guaranteeing that the verdict will reflect a true social consensus, and by
convincing the community as a whole that the verdict is worthy of respect.
The Holland majority avoided this insight by setting up jury impartiality
as the only value of constitutional significance in the Sixth Amendment's Jury
Clause: Justice Scalia was careful to distinguish between "a representative jury
(which the Constitution does not demand)" and "an impartial one (which it
does). 30 2 But this distinction is patently false. The Court's jury size and
unanimity cases show that the "jury" described in the Sixth Amendment is not
just an impartial body, but also a representative one.3 3 Community
representation and impartiality may often be conflicting values, but they are
both within the Sixth Amendment's command; the Court has the difficult job
of striking a workable balance between the two values, not the easy job it
assigned itself in Holland of abandoning one of them. Reliability, then, is not
equal to impartiality, as the Holland Court would have it. Reliability sits at the
intersection of impartiality and community representation.
It is from this insight about the criminal verdict, an insight that flows from
the opinions of the Batson opponents themselves, that a limiting principle
emerges. To be sure, postmen are, as Justice Scalia suggests, just as
"identifiable" a group within the community as are blacks. Yet few
communities are riven by discord about mail delivery. More importantly, no
one has suggested that postmen are likely to hold unique views about the range
of sensitive and potentially divisive issues that arise in criminal cases-views
that people in other professions would likely not hold. The important question
for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment inquiry is not whether a particular
group is "identifiable," for surely there is an infinite number of such groups
in any community. The important questions are whether a group is identifiable
and whether an attorney might rationally deem its viewpoint genuinely
299. Holland, 493 U.S. at 486.
300. See supra Section VI.A.
301. On the educative and political functions of juries and jury service, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1186-89 (1991); Amar, supra note 206; Amar, supra note
47, at 217-21; Marder, supra note 79, at 1083-86, 1098-99; Underwood, supra note 43, at 749-50.
302. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480.
303. See supra note 284.
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distinctive; that is, whether the group likely has a perspective on the deeply
divisive kinds of issues that can arise in criminal cases that another identifiable
group is unlikely to share. 301 It is the exclusion of that sort of identifiable
group that undermines the Sixth Amendment's commitment to
representation,.. and with it, the jury's mission of producing reliable
verdicts.
This is not to say that groups defined by their race or their gender are the
only groups whose purposeful exclusion from petit juries the Sixth Amendment
would forbid. A limited number of other groups, such as religious groups,'
304. See Cammack, supra note 29, at 480-81 (lilt cannot be denied that race. gcndcr. and cthnicit)
are highly salient categories of social understanding in our society and have been for a %ery long time ')
305. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522. 530 (1975) (*"Restricting jury service to only special
groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the conanunrs, cannot be squared wtth
the constitutional concept of jury trial." (emphasis added)). Of course, the jury serves more than one value
Not only must it represent (or, more precisely, not designedly misrepresent) the community. but it must also
be "impartial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is not difficult to see how the two values of community
representation and impartiality might sometimes conflict with one another For example. some segment of
the community undoubtedly deems the death penalty so unjust that its members would refus even to
consider voting to impose it in any case, regardless of the facts See Witherspoon v Illinois. 391 U S 510.
513 (1968). This segment of the community has come to be known as "1itherspoon excludables" in the
case law. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162. 167 n.1 (1986). To say that the Sixth Amendment forbids
the purposeful underrepresentation of Witherspoon excludables is to say that the Sixth Amendment requirec
the seating of "partial" jurors-jurors who cannot "lay aside Itheir] impresion[s) or opinionlsl and render
a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Irvin , Dowd. 366 U S 717, 723 1961). see McCr'e-,
476 U.S. at 174 (rejecting claim that Withierspoon excludables are distinctise group within community tor
Sixth Amendment purposes).
Where these two values conflict, the Sixth Amendment should be read to require as reasonable an
accommodation of them as possible. See Massaro, supra note 248. at 541-42 (arguing that jury that satisfies
Sixth Amendment is one that meets requirements of impartiality. community representation, and per-group
representation). It should not be read to require community representation at all costs If. for example, a
black juror stated on voir dire that he would be unable to set aside his belief that all policc officcm are
evidence-fabricating liars utterly unworthy of belief, that juror would properly be excludable for cause. escn
if his views accurately reflected those of some segment of the black community On the other hand. if an
attorney challenged a black juror on the suspicion that that juror had had certain life expertences that w% ould
cause him to doubt the veracity or integrity of police officers in some instances, the Sixth Amendment's
concern for community representation would trump its concern for impartiality. and the juror %%ould sit See
McCree, 476 U.S. at 176 (noting that jurors who "firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may
nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are %hiling to temporanly
set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law").
306. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, CJ, dissrnting). Elaine A Carlson.
Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptorn Strikes in the Jun Selction
Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 970-75 (1994) (analyzing propriety under Batson of religion-based
peremptory challenges and of voir dire questions designed to probe prospective juror's religious beliefs),
Brian E. Leach, Comment. Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Gender and Bevnd T71e Death Knell for the
Peremptory Challenge?, 19 S. ILL. U. L. REv. 381, 398 (1995) (summanzing case law addrevsng pmsible
extension of Batson to religion-based perempiones): Angela J Mason. Note. Discriminatin Based on
Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge' Coffin "
. 
29 GA L REV 493 (1995)
(arguing that logic requires extension of Batson to religion, which will result in demiw of peremptory
challenge). But see 1. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note. Appling the Br'ak Religion and the Peremptorn
Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569 (1995) (arguing that extension of Batson to peremptones exercised on account
of religion is neither constitutionally required nor desirable as matter of policN
To date, the courts have largely declined to extend Batson's protection to religious groups See State
v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied. 114 S Ct 2120 (1994). Ca-arez s Texas. 913
S.W.2d 468, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en bane) (holding. on rehearing. that peremptory challenges may
be exercised on basis of religion in individual cases). But see Dars. 114 S Ci at 2120-22 (Thomas. J .
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that logic of J EB would require Court to condemn
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might also qualify. The number of identifiable groups, however, would be
relatively small, certainly not extending, as Justice Scalia worried in Holland,
to "postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen" 307-or, to return to the example with
which this Article began, to people who contribute to public broadcasting. In
its cases on the Sixth Amendment's requirement of jury selection from a
"representative cross-section" of the community, the Court has had little
trouble limiting community representation to groups it deems "distinctive"
within the community.3°' The Court has quite sensibly rejected the claim that
"groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or
substantially impair members of the group from performing one of their duties
as jurors ... are . . . 'distinctive groups' for fair-cross-section purposes."3"
Instead, the Court has deemed "distinctive" only those groups that play "major
roles" in the community3'--groups such as blacks, women, and Mexican-
Americans, 31  who may share broad experiential influences on their
perspective, yet who do not, as groups, predictably harbor the conscious and
intractable biases that would render them invariably challengeable for
cause.312 The Court has plainly been able to manage the concept of
community representation in its representative cross section cases. 3 3 There
peremptory challenges exercised on religious grounds).
307. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486 (1990). See generally Laurie Magid, Challenges to Jury
Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1081, 1104-11 (1987) (describing judicial efforts to determine which community groups are cognizable for
Sixth Amendment purposes). But cf. Marder, supra note 79, at 1104 (suggesting that "dividing people
according to distinctive groups is a difficult task and one that is likely to seem unfair to, and be divisive
within, the community").
308. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
309. McCree, 476 U.S. at 174 (emphasis added).
310. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
311. McCree, 476 U.S. at 175.
312. See supra note 29.
313. The lower federal courts have also proven themselves equal to this task. In Willis v. Zant, 720
F.2d 1212 (11 th Cir. 1983), the court was presented with a claim that "young adults from age 18-30" were
a distinctive community group for Sixth Amendment purposes. See id. at 1215. To resolve this claim, the
court laid down a test:
To show that a group is distinctive or cognizable under the sixth amendment, a defendant must
show: (I) that the group is defined and limited by some factor (i.e., that the group has a definite
composition such as by race or sex); (2) that a common thread or basic similarity in attitude,
ideas, or experience runs through the group; and (3) that there is a community of interest among
members of the group such that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented if the
group is excluded from the jury selection process.
Id. at 1216.
Other courts have applied the Willis test, or one like it, to reach the conclusion that young adults, and
various other groups, do not constitute distinctive groups within the community for Sixth Amendment
purposes. See United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1992) (college students); Silagy
v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1009-11 (7th Cir. 1990) (people over 70); United States v. Canfield, 879 F.2d 446,
447 (8th Cir. 1989) (residents of Minneapolis); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 1988) (young
adults aged 18-29); United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1218-20 (3d Cir. 1986) (members of
National Rifle Association); Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d I, 5-8 (lst Cir. 1986) ("blue collar workers" and
"less educated individuals"); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997-1000 (Ist Cir. 1985) (en banc) (young
adults aged 18-34); United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (unemployed, young,
and non-high school graduates); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1973) (people aged
18-20). The Willis test is a sensible one. Coupled with the Supreme Court's admonition in McCree that
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is no reason to believe that the Court could not also do so in a case concerning
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
This proposal is, in a sense, a reworking of John Hart Ely's justly famous
explanation of the ways in which racial and gender prejudice skew the
legislative process." A premise of Ely's work is that identifiable groups in
society have identifiable views and interests that often diverge from the views
and interests of other groups. The democratic idea, however, is that these
groups will ordinarily be able to negotiate and compromise with one another
to work out mutually beneficial arrangements in the legislative process.
Judicial review, according to Ely, should function to police failures of that
democratic idea-situations where, because of prejudice, certain identifiable
groups are perpetually unable to find common ground with enough others to
secure legislative success.315
I am suggesting that certain groups may find it as difficult to find common
ground with others in the jury room as they do in the legislature. Where there
is purposeful exclusion of such groups, the result is a similarly deep, and
similarly dangerous, flaw in representation. At bottom, the Sixth Amendment
is concerned with preventing flaws in jury representation, much as the
Fourteenth is with preventing the flaws of political representation that have
been Ely's special concern. These amendments have at least one similar goal:
Just as our legislatures must apportion benefits and burdens in a way that the
entire community will respect and accept, our juries must do the same through
their verdicts. Just as flaws in representation undermine the fairness of
legislative outcomes, those flaws also undermine the reliability of criminal
verdicts.
31 6
distinctive groups do not include "-any group defined solely in terms of shared attributes that render
members of that group unable to serve as jurors in a particular case." McCree. 476 U S at 176-77. the
Willis test presents a workable way for courts to police the limits of community representation
314. See JOHN HART ELY, DF_.MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980)
315. See id.
316. Nothing that I have said in this Article demonstrates that the Sixth Amendment %ould support
the result that the Court reached in Georgia %: McCollum, 505 U S 42. 48-55. 59 (1992). extending the
Batson prohibition to criminal defense counsel. This does not mean that the Sixth Amendment definitely
would not support the result in McCollum; it means only that the question of whether the Sixth
Amendment's Jury Clause protects the government as well as the accused is beyond the scope of this
Article. On that subject, see generally Susan Bandes. Taking Some Rights Too Sernousl The State'l Right
to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1987). as well as Amar. supra note 85. at 681-82
It is worth noting, however, that even if the Sixth Amendment forbade defense counsel from engaging
in discriminatory jury selection, the question of the appropriate appellate remedy for such discrimination
would not arise. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause sould preclude the govemment from
appealing any acquittal that followed from defense counsel's jury discrimination, and the gos ernment would
have no incentive to complain if it obtained a conviction. The McCollum case itself made its way to the
Supreme Court only because the State had filed a pre-trnal moiton to forbid defense counsel from %tolating
Batson, the trial court had denied that motion, and the State was given permission to take an interlocutory
appeal. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 45.
In a similar vein, nothing in this Article suggests that the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee
in civil cases would support the result that the Court reached in Edmonson v: Leeille Concrete Co. 500
U.S. 614 (1991). As noted earlier, the problem of discriminatory peremptory challenges in the civil setting
1996]
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The potential link between popular representation in the legislature and on
the jury is not lost on at least some members of the Court. In a very recent
(and typically thoughtful) dissenting opinion in a voting rights case, Justice
Souter noted that his view that states might permissibly use race in the
drawing of voting district lines was at odds with Batson and the Court's other
cases on the use of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 317 Justice
Souter asserted that legislatures and juries are distinguishable: "Politics," he
wrote, "includes choices between different sets of social values, choices that
may ultimately turn on the ability of a particular group to enforce its demands
through the ballot box., 318 "Jury decisionmaking," on the other hand, "is
defined as a neutral process, the impartial application of law to a set of
objectively discovered facts. ' 3' 9 He concluded that "[tlo require racial
balance in jury selection would risk redefining the jury's role. 320
While I do not argue in this Article for any sort of numerical "racial
balance" in the selection of juries, I disagree with the rigidity in Justice
Souter's distinction of legislatures from juries. If, as Justice Souter himself
concedes, "race, especially as an imperfect proxy for experience, makes a
difference in jury decisionmaking (and, in some cases, legitimately so), ''32I
then it cannot also be true that juries do nothing more than "impartial[ly]
appl[y] law to a set of objectively discovered facts. 322 Rather, juries, like
legislatures, are a meeting place for the various experiences and, in Justice
Souter's words, "sets of social values," of distinctive groups in the
community."' To recognize this is not to redefine the jury's role; it is to
give life to the very same aspect of the jury's role that animated the Court's
cases on jury size and unanimity: the jury as a representative of the community
from which it is drawn.
is beyond this Article's scope. See supra note 18. On the issue of community representation on the civil
jury, see generally Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 29 (1994).
It bears mentioning, though, that even if the Seventh Amendment supported the result in Edmonson
for federal civil cases, it probably would not support that result in state civil cases, because the Seventh
Amendment's jury trial guarantee is among the provisions of the first eight amendments that have not been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
192 n.6 (1974) (holding that jury trial in civil cases is not privilege or immunity of national citizenship
which states are forbidden by Fourteenth Amendment to abridge); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1875) (same); see also Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding
that Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee does not apply in state court civil cases).
317. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 2001 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer.
JJ., dissenting).
318. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
319. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
320. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
321. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
322. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
323. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer. JJ.. dissenting).
[Vol. 106: 93
Solving the Batson Paradox
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has traced a path through the inconsistencies in the positions
of the Court's champions and critics of Batson. At the beginning of the path
was a question: How does race or gender discrimination in the selection of
petit jurors affect the fairness of trials? At the end of the path is an answer:
Jury discrimination undermines the fairness of trials not by offending the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but by abrogating the jury
trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.
This is not to say, of course, that race and gender discrimination in jury
selection do not offend any equal protection values. As Batson's proponents
have made clear in their cases extending the Batson norm, jury discrimination
causes serious stigmatic and participational harms that touch the core of the
Equal Protection Clause. The trouble is that these harms do not supply a
reason for reversing convictions, which is what the Batson proponents want to
do. Their frequent, vague pronouncements about the fairness of trials and the
appearance of fairness are entirely empty since these Justices define the Batson
violation in a way that forecloses any of the harms that they describe.
It is the Justices who do not seem to want to reverse convictions for
Batson error 324 who provide the most compelling reason for doing so. If, as
Justice Scalia asserts, jurors are not fungible, then their dismissal on account
of race or gender must distort the jury's deliberations and verdicts. Jury
discrimination impeaches the reliability of the verdict as a trustworthy
consensus of the community on the question of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. This is not an equal protection harm, 33 but a harm to the twin
goals of representation and reliability which are the central mission of the
criminal jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. It is, moreover, classic
Fulminante-style "structural error": error with imperceptible yet detrimental
effect on the verdict.
326
In order to reach the conclusion that this Article recommends, both camps
of Justices-those who champion the Batson norm and those who oppose
it-will have to set aside some of their views. Batson's proponents should stop
324. See supra notes 214-43 and accompanying text.
325. As I have explained earlier, discriminatory peremptones do offend core equal protcction valucs
See supra Section IV.A-B. Thus I do not argue in this Article that Batson and its progeny scre c rongl,
decided as a matter of equal protection law, see supra note 76 (identfying issues insolsed in analyzing
Batson as equal protection law), simply that the equal protection theory of Batson does not adquatel)
account for the fair trial harm caused by the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges My proposal is
intended not to replace Batson, but to coexist with it and to provide a coherent reason for automatically
reversing convictions tainted by Batson error. The reach of the Sixth Amendment theory that I propose in
this Article is admittedly somewhat narrower than the current reach of Batson in all its applications See
supra note 316.
326. See Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275. 279-82 (1993) (holding that rial couri's failure to
instruct jury properly on reasonable doubt standard denied defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
and was "structural error" requiring automatic reversal).
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their shrill attacks on the theory of difference and acknowledge that race and
gender are at least minimally rational predictors of perspective. Batson's
opponents will have to drop their revisionist insistence that the Sixth
Amendment says nothing about the representativeness of the seated petit jury;
that is, the Court will have to overrule Holland v. Illinois. These developments
would be welcome, as they would allow both camps of Justices to rid
themselves of the inconsistencies that plague their own positions. More
importantly, they would allow the whole Court to announce coherently what
its factions have suggested incoherently-namely, that race and gender
discrimination in the selection of petit jurors makes criminal verdicts
unreliable.
